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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation for security boundary visualization 
In the open access environment, utilities face a number of challenges to be more 
competitive. One of these challenges is that typical operating conditions tend to be 
much closer to security boundaries. This is because transmission utilization is increasing 
in sudden and unpredictable directions, and competition together with other regulators-
requirements make new transmission facility construction more difficult. Consequently, 
security levels for the transmission network must be accurate and easily identified on-line 
by system operators. 
Power system security assessment can be divided into two levels: classification and 
boundary' determination. Classification involves determining whether the system is se­
cure or insecure under all prespecified contingencies. The sv'stem is secure if the post-
contingency performance is acceptable. Classification does not in itself indicate distance 
from the operating condition to the insecure conditions. Boundeirj* determination, on 
the other hand, involves quantifving this distance. A boundary- is represented by con­
straints imposed on parameters characterizing precontingency conditions. These pre-
contingency parameters are called critical parameters. Once the boundar>- is identified, 
security assessment for any operating point can be given as the distance (in terms of 
critical parameters) between the current operating point and the boundarv'. Assess­
ment in terms of precontingency operating parameters instead of the postcontingency 
performance measure is more meaningful to the operator. 
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1.2 Traditional security boundary visualization approach 
In many North American utilities, the traditional boundar\- characterization ap­
proach is used to generate a two-dimensional graph called a nomogram [1] - [3]. of 
which two axes correspond to two critical parameters. To develop a nomogram, two 
critical parameters are chosen and all other critical parameters are set to selected values 
within a typical operating range. The noncritical parameters, which may influence the 
postcontingency performance measure, are set to constant values biased to be conserva­
tive with respect to the influence on the performance measure. Points on the nomogram 
curve are determined by repeating computer simulations. var\-ing one critical parameter 
while keeping the other constant. If the relationship between the performance measure 
and the critical parameters is fairly linear, interpolation and/or extrapolation helps to 
obtain boundary' points. In this case, only three or four simulations may be needed. 
But highly nonlinear relationships may require more simulations. The above procedure 
is repeated for selected values of the first critical parameter provides enough boundary-
points to draw the nomogram curve. In the case where there is a third critical pa­
rameter value change, a different nomogram curve is drawn for each value of this third 
critical parameter so that the result is a family of nomogram curves, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. Inclusion of a fourth critical parameter value change requires a distinct 
family of nomogram curves (i.e., a new page) for each new \-alue of the fourth critical 
parameter. Inclusion of fifth critical parameter value change requires a distinct family 
of pages for each new \^ue of the fifth critical parameter, and so on. Ob\iously. the 
above manual approach requires intensive labor involvement. The other disadvantages 
include inaccurate boundary representation and little flexibility to integrate with the 
energy management sj'stem (EMS). 
There are two main approximations made in nomogram development which can ul­
timately result in inaccurate boundary characterization when the nomogram is used by 
Figure 1.1 Xomogram curves for three critical parameters 
the operator. One is linear interpolation between points. The other is insufficient infor­
mation contained in critical parameters. Because of labor requirements, the simulation 
procedure described above is normally used to obtain only a ver\' few points on the 
boundar\-; indeed, often only the "comer points" are obtained. The remaining portions 
of the boundar>- are obtained by drawing a straight line through the computed points. 
This approximation can be improved by automating the security assessment process so 
that the number of points generated is only limited by computer availability, and by 
using neural networks, an interpolation tool that models ver\- well nonlinear portions of 
the boundarj-. As for the second approximation, nomogram development usually limits 
the number of critical parameters to five or less, even when there are other parameters 
knowTi to be influential. There are two reasons for this. First, having more critical 
parameters requires performing more simulations. Second, it is difficult to compactly 
represent the information to the operator if there are more than five critical parameters. 
For example, if the fourth and fifth parameters have six different levels of interest, the 
operator would require 36 pages of three parcimater nomogram curves. Limiting the 
number of critical paramaters may mean that the information content of the parameters 
that are used is insufficient for accurately predicting the performance measure. The 
approximation due to insufficient information contained in critical parameters can be 
improved by automatically performing a large number of simulations with little atten­
4 
tion from the analyst, and by using neural networks that provide compact boundar\-
characterization for any number of critical parameters. The difficulty in integrating the 
procedure into the EMS lies in the manual nature of the traditional approach. This can 
be solved by using an automatic approach. 
Therefore, to overcome the disadvantages of the traditional approach, an automatic 
security boundar>' visualization methodology- has been developed using intelligent tech­
niques [4] - [8]. 
1.3 Automatic security boundary visualization methodology 
As Figure 1.2 shows, the procedure developed in this dissertation to determine and 
illustrate security boundaries includes six steps. 
r 
Step I Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Identify 
Security 
Problem 
Construct 
Basecase DATA GENERATION 
(AulonuDc secunty 
assessment software) 
J KEEP\ 
•7 HLE r 
(Large 
database 1/ 
FEATURE SELECTION 
(Genetic algorithm 
based t'eature selection) 
vy 
Step 6 Step 5 1 
NEURAL NETWORK 
VISUAUZATION 
WEncodedV 
Input/ 1 
output 1 
\ relation/ 
TRAINING 
J 
Figure 1.2 Procedure for security boundary- visualization 
1. Security problem identification: This step is no different from what is done when 
generating nomograms in the traditional, manual way. Therefore, it is a task of 
the engineer to identify- the specific set of security constraints to be characterized 
and candidate operating parameters that may have influence on these constraints. 
5 
2. Base case construction: This is also much like what is done in the traditional way. 
A base case power flow solution needs to be constructed that appropriately models 
the system conditions of concern. 
3. Data generation: This step involves an automated procedure that generates a large 
database, with each record consisting of precontingency operating parameters and 
the corresponding postcontingency performance measure. 
4. Feature selection: This step selects the best subset of precontingency operating 
parameters for use in predicting the postcontingency performance measure. 
5. Neural network training: Based on the selected parameters and the data base 
obtained from previous steps, this step perform neural network training for function 
approximation of the mapping from the precontingency operating parameters to 
the postcontingency performance meaisure. 
6. Visualization and presentation: This step integrates the encoded neural network 
mapping into a visualization software that can be used on-line to generate the 
security boundarv-. 
Although it is assumed in this dissertation that steps 1 to 5 are performed off-line, 
it is expected that our development of these steps will ultimately be applicable on-line. 
1.4 Scimple system 
A sample sv'stem is shown in Figure 1.3. This is just a simplified illustration of a 
real system, a 2500-bus model of Northern California. The detailed sj-stem is used for 
all simulations throughout this research. This 2500-bus nodel will be used for testing 
all studies conducted in this dissertation. The load in the subarea, diuing high loading 
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conditions, is greater than the generation capacity in the subarea. Therefore, a signifi­
cant amount of power must be imported into the subarea to meet the demand. There 
are several ties between the subarea and the remaining part of the system. Based on 
experience and knowledge of the system, we know that operation of generators .4,. B, 
and C under high subarea loadings is constrained by two different security problems as 
described below. 
Intertie I 
Area 
Tic 
Gen B 
Tic 2 Subarea 
Gen A Gen C 
K3 
Tic 3 
Tic 4 
Load 
Tie 5 
Intertie 2 
Figure 1.3 A sample s\-stem 
1.4.1 Thermal overload 
Thermal overload on a piece of equipment means that the equipment carries a cur­
rent above its normal current carr^-ing ability. Thermal overload can cause overheating 
on the equipment which results in equipment performence degradation. For example, 
thermal overload on an overhead line can cause sag increase which results in short-circuit 
faults and conductor strength decrease which reduces the life time of the line. Thermal 
overload occurs on tie line 5 when tie line 3 is outaged under certain conditions. The 
/ 
postcontingency performance measure is tiie flow in ampere on tie line 5. The emergency 
rating of tie line 5 is /q = 600A. Therefore, the threshold \-alue for this constraint is 
/o = 600A. and when the performance measure is normalized according to 
we have /?o = 0 on the boundary'. The more negative the R value, the more secure the 
system. 
1.4.2 Voltage instability 
Voltage instability is the inability of a power system to maintain steady acceptable 
voltages at all buses in the system under normal operating conditions and small dis­
turbances. The main factor causing instability is the inability of the power system to 
meet the demand for reactive power. A system is voltage unstable if at least one bus 
voltage magnitude decreases as the capacitive reactive power injection at the same bus 
is increased [9]. Various anah-tical methods on voltage stability can be found in [10] 
- [17]. For the sample system, the outage of tie line 3 can cause voltage instability 
problems in the subarea. One load bus in the subarea has been identified as the most 
reactive deficient bus. A secure operating point on the boundary- is defined as one for 
which this bus has at least Qo=*-00 MVAr of reactive margin following loss of tie line 3. 
The performance measure is M\A.r margin Q at this load bus. When the performance 
measure for this problem is normalized according to 
^  _  Q o  - Q  
Qo 
we have i2o = 0 on the boundary. 
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1.5 Contributions of this dissertation 
The objective of this dissertation is to develop the security assessment methodolog\-
of Figure 1.2 that results in highly accurate portrayal of operating boundaries for system 
operators in terms of easily monitorable operating parameters such as generation, load, 
flow, and voltage levels. In the context of this objective, this dissertation will make the 
following main contributions. 
1.5.1 Development of a systematic data generation method 
Data generation is always an important issue for neural network applications. 
systematic data generation method has been developed to generate high quality data 
through simulation for any kind of security assessment problems^ The developed 
method uses boundary- search and revised Latin hypercube sampling to ensure that 
the data set is centered around the boundary- to be characterized and well resolved 
throughout the parameter operating ranges. 
1.5.2 Development of an efficient feature selection tool for operating pa­
rameter selection 
Another important issue in neural network applications is the chioce of pcirameters to 
be used as the neural network inputs. This is because good or bad features lead to good 
or bad neural network prediction accuracy. A genetic algorithm based feature selection 
tool has been developed to select the best operating parameters as the neural network 
inputs. A multilayer perceptron was initially used for fitness e\*aluation. However, it has 
been found that use of radial basis function networks instead of multilayer perceptrons, 
the solution speed could be greatly improved. With k-nearest neighbor method, the 
solution speed could be further improved. 
'The initial development work was done by Dr. Shimo Wang. 
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1.5.3 Application of data analysis techniques for neural network training 
Even if care is taken to ensure the quality of data during data generation, it is still 
possible that the data set contains outliers or is not well distributed. Statistical data 
analysis techniques have been used to analyze the data for outliers and for distribution. 
These techniques include principal component analysis, k-nearest neighbor estimation. 
raulti\-ariate normality test, scatter plots, and projection pursuit visualization. 
1.5.4 Confidence interval calculation for neural network performance 
evaluation 
A confidence interval calculation has been derived for multilayer perceptrons. It has 
been used to measure the reliability of neural network outputs. 
1.5.5 Sensitivity analysis of neural network outputs with respect to in­
puts 
The relative influential ability of the neural network input parameters on the output 
can provide preventive control guidance in manoeuvering the current operating point 
with respect to the boundar\\ Therefore, sensitivity analysis formulas of neural network 
outputs with respect to inputs have been derived for multilayer perceptrons and the 
corresponding calculations have been performed for the neural network that was used 
to characterize the boundary. 
1.5.6 Development of a composite boundary visualization algorithm 
Based on the trained neural network, a composite boundar\- visualization algorithm 
has been developed to draw a two-dimensional diagram for multiple security problems 
under the Scime contingency. The boundary can be on-line displayed to the user. The 
user can select to view any boundary for any pair of controllable operating parameters. 
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1.5.7 Available transfer capability calculation based on the boundary 
Under the open access power marketing environment, the a\-ailable transfer capability 
between control areas or along a transaction path is required to be posted regularly. A 
new method for the available transfer capability calculation has been proposed based on 
the boundar\-. This method is verv' straightforward once the boundary* is obtained. 
1.6 Organization of this dissertation 
After introduction in Chapter 1. the remaining chapters of this dissertation are or­
ganized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on intelligent technique applications 
to security assessment. Chapter 3 presents a systematic method for data generation and 
some techniques for data analysis. Chapter 4 describes a genetic algorithm based fea­
ture selection tool for choosing operating parameters cis neural network inputs. Chapter 
5 discusses the neural network training and analysis. Chapter 6 describes boundary-
presentation techniques. Chapter 7 draws conclusions and suggests further work. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Intelligent techniques mainly include neural networks, expert systems, fuzzy logic, 
evolutionar}' algorithms (genetic algorithms, evolution strategies, and evolutionary- pro­
gramming). and machine learning. These techniques have been applied with some suc­
cess to various areas in power systems in the past few years. Security assessment is one 
area with many such applications. Security assessment can be divided into static security 
cissessment and dynamic security assessment depending on whether transient behavior is 
considered. For example, thermal overload and voltage violations following the loss of a 
transmission line are static security problems, and the loss of synchronism among gener­
ators and voltage collapse following a disturbance are dv-namic security problems. Since 
anahtical techniques for security assessment are quite time-consuming, they are difficult 
to apply for on-line use although there has been progress in this area recently [18. 19]. 
Because neural networks can map nonlinear relationships among data and the solution 
speed for trjiined neural networks is fast, they are suitable for on-line use. A large num­
ber of publications on neural network applications to security assessment have appeared 
since Sobajic et al. [20] and Aggoune et al. [21] explored neural network capability of 
assessing transient stability and steady-state security. Some representative examples of 
them are discussed below. 
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2.2 Neural network applications to security cissessment 
Sobajic et al. [20] use multilayer perceptrons as classifiers with precontingency pa­
rameters (rotor angles of generators, accelerating power, and accelerating energ\-) as 
inputs and post contingency security measure (critical clearing time) as output. Ag-
goune et al. [21] also use multilayer perceptrons as classifiers, but inputs are real and 
reactive injections. e.xcitation gains of generators and other parameters, and the output 
is the security status which is determined by system eigenv-alues. Zhou et al. [22] apply 
a neural network to the concept of system vulnerability based on the transient energ\-
function method. Miranda et al. [23] propose an approach to transient stability enhance­
ment based on neural network sensitivity analysis. El-Keib et al. [24] apply multilayer 
perceptrons for voltage stability assessment with the energ\- margin as the stability in­
dex and determine input parameters for neural network training by sensitivity analysis. 
Momoh et al. [25] also use multilayer perceptrons to determine reactive compensation 
to enhance voltage stability. La Scala et al. [26] apply multilayer perceptrons to voltage 
security monitoring based on a dynamic system model. 
In the previous references, supervised learning algorithms are used for neural network 
training. Niebur et al. [27] use a Kohonen network to map similar input patterns into 
neighboring nodes in topology*. Unsupervised learning algorithms are used for neural 
network training. After training, if one knows which cluster is associated with which 
state (secure or insecure), one can identify- the current system as secure or insecure after 
mapping the operating state. A similar anproach is .studied by El-Sharkawi et al. [28] 
where different maps are constructed for different contingencies. Sobajic et al. [29] use a 
combination of supervised and unsupervised learning for dvnamic security assessment. 
More literature on neural network applications to power systems can be found in [30, 31]. 
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2.3 Problems related to neural network applications 
There are many problems to be considered when using neural networks for security 
assessment. These problems include selection of neural network architecture and learn­
ing algorithm, checking data quality, selection of the most predictive features to reduce 
the input dimensionality, monitoring the training process to avoid underfitting or over-
fitting, and performance evaluation of the output. Some of them have been studied in 
the power system context. Zayan et al. [63] compare the minimum entropy method and 
the Karhunen — Loeve expansion for feature extraction with application to security 
classification. Muknahallipatna et al. [64] use the linear correlation method and dis­
criminant analysis for feature extraction. Some of these problems will be addressed in 
the subsequent chapters. 
2.4 Other intelligent technique applications to security assess­
ment 
In addition to the previously described neural network applications, other intelligent 
methods have also found use in security assessment, either as main tools or as supporting 
techniques. Wehenkel et al. [32, 33, 34, 35, 36] has made significant contributions to 
security assessment by applv-ing machine learning approach via decision trees. This 
work has resulted in an approach to fast and accurate classification of an operating point 
(see [36] for in-depth discussions). Similar investigations by others are also reported [37. 
38, 39, 40]. Pecas Lopes et al. [41] report a fast dvTiamic security assessment method 
using genetic programming. Hatziargj-riou et al. [42] conduct a comparative study on k-
nearest neighbor, decision tree, and neural network approaches for a small isolated power 
s\*stem. Their results show that the main advantage of the neural network approach 
over the other two is its more accurate classification. When using neural networks, it 
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is required, at least for large systems, that the computer simulations be automated. 
Therefore, many of the previous references also mention some form of an expert system 
for this purpose. Marceau et al. [43] reports an advanced expert system of this nature. 
Huneault et al. [44] provide a literature and industry- sur\-ey of expert system applications 
in power engineering. 
.•\s each intelligent technique has its own disadvantages, some studies on hybrid in­
telligent technique applications to security assessment have been reported. Wehenkel 
et al. [45. 46] propose two hybrid approaches. One is the combination of decision tree 
and neural network where a tree is first built and then translated into a layered neu­
ral network. This can improve the reliability of decision trees while maintaining their 
advantages of simplicity and computational efficiency. The other is the combination 
of decision trees and k-nearest neighbor where, in the nearest neighbor distance com­
putation. the algorithm uses only attributes selected by a decision tree. This method 
is faster and more reliable compared with k-nearest neighbor method. Van et al. [47] 
use a hybrid expert system/neural network for contingency classification. El-Sharkawi 
et al. [48. 49] use the genetic algorithm to set up the initial weights or train neural 
networks for dynamic security assessment. 
2.5 Another approach - security assessment via boundary vi-
su£dization 
Most references mentioned above concern classification of the operating point as 
secure or insecure following a contingency with respect to a pzirticular security problem 
such as thermal overload, djTiamic security, and voltage instability. A few of them use 
postcontingency margins as security criteria. This research focuses on a methodology 
that can be used on-line for determining and illustrating the security boundarv* for 
any tjpe of security problem. Another approach adopted in this dissertation is function 
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approximation instead of classification. In this approach, one will know not only whether 
the current system operating condition is secure but also how far it is from the boundary-
in terms of easily controllable parameters; there is therefore built-in to our approach 
corrective action guidance. A systematic method has been developed to generate data 
for neural network use. The resulting data generation software is a general, flexible 
package that can also be used for other problems involving neural network applications. 
Another important problem in neural network applications is what input features should 
be used. To solve this problem, a genetic algorithm based feature selection tool has been 
developed for neural networks. Finally, it is emphasized that the approach to obtain 
the boundar>- can be applied to all kinds of security problems and their combinations, 
rather than just one. 
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3 DATA GENERATION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction 
Data generation is a ver\' important part of the procedure. Quality of the data is 
a key factor that affects the performance of neural network, hence the accuracy of the 
boundarv*. If the data does not reflect the actual behaviors of power system operations, 
one can not expect the resulting boundary- to be correct. The developed software to 
generate the data is called an automatic security assessment software (AS.A.S). It is 
descibed in in Section 3.2. Data analysis is to analyze the data to ensure that both 
data distribution and data coverage are good for neural network training. Several data 
analysis techniques are discussed for use in analyzing the data following data generation 
in Section 3.3 
3.2 Data generation 
.A.SAS, illustrated in Figure 3.1. is used to generate a large database containing data 
characterizing precontingency operating conditions and corresponding system perfor­
mances for one specific contingency. The simulation tool, as a module, interfaces with 
the other ASAS modules so that one can replace it with software appropriate for analysis 
of the problem under study. In the thermal overload example, the simulation tool is a 
power flow program called IPFLOVV developed by EPRI. IPFLOW is also used to set 
up the initial operating conditions. Power flow study is a basic tool for system design. 
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planning, and operation. The power flow equations can be expressed as 
.V 
= 51 I I COS(0.A: + 8 k -  & , )  (3.1) 
k=l 
.V 
Qi = — I I sin(0iA: + ^IFC — ^i) (3.2) 
k=l 
where Pi and Qi are the real and reactive power injections at bus i, Ytk is the admittance 
between bus i and bus j. 1] is the complex voltage at bus i. 0,^ is the phase angle 
difference of voltage from bus i to bus k. and 9i is the phase angle of voltage at bus i. 
There are typically N — IP. equations and .V — Ng — IQ, equations to solve where .V is 
the number of bueses and \g is the number of buses with generators. Solution to the 
power flow program can provide a snapshot of the system operating conditions. The 
basic idea for data generation is to change the operating conditions and run the power 
flow program to simulate the specific contingency. 
In the voltage stability example, the simulation tool is a voltage assessment program 
called V'CMARGIN provided by a power company. 
Section 3.2.1 provides an overview of the fundamental concepts on which development 
of ASAS is based. Section 3.2.2 describes the key criteria to be used in setting up the 
data for ASAS. Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 provide details on the two techniques called 
boundary- search and structured Monte Carlo sampling. 
3.2.1 Overview 
ASAS generates the data required for neural network training. This data consists of 
a large number of samples, with each sample corresponding to a simulation of the same 
contingency but for different operating conditions, and consisting of precontingency oper­
ating parameters (the critical parameter candidates) together ^^•ith the postcontingency 
performance measure. A KEEP file is generated as illustrated by Table 3.1. 
Here, Xi is the i-th parameter of Nc critical parameter candidates denoted by vector 
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Figure 3.1 Automatic security assessment software package. 
Table 3.1 The structure of a KEEP file. 
Sample No. •ri Xo -C:VV R 
1 
2 
a; 
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X, and R is the performance measure. There are Nr samples (rows) in the KEEP file. 
This is the output of .A.SAS that is used to train the neural network. 
The objective of the data generation software is: Given an operating range and an 
operating range resolution, create a data set of samples that best reflects the dependency 
of the postcontingency performance measure on variation in precontingency operating 
conditions. 
More formally, let us represent the vector of bus voltage angles and magnitudes by 
w, the vector of real and reactive bus injections by u. and the vector of circuit flows by 
y. Then the power flow equations can be wTitten as h(w, u) = 0. and circuit flows can 
be computed by y = g(w). Let us further represent the scalar postcontingency perfor­
mance by R which quantifies the acceptability of the system response following a specific 
contingency. Then the value of R is uniquely determined by the precontingency operat­
ing condition, i.e.. R = F(w, u). We assume, however, that R may be computed more 
compactly and with a good level of accuracy, using a small subset of parameters x." taken 
from w. u. and y, i.e., x* C (w U u U y) resulting in R according to R = /(x"). Given 
that we can obtain the function /, and given that we specify a threshold performance 
measure Rq beyond which system performance is unacceptable, the boundary associated 
with the contingency can be expressed as the set of feasible operating conditions which 
solve /(x") = Rq. We shift and normalize the function to force /?o = 0 so that /? < 0 
denotes acceptable performance and R> 0 denotes unacceptable performance. 
There are two special techniques employed by ASAS in accomplishing the stated 
objective. These are boundary* search and structured Monte Carlo sampling. The first 
technique provides that the samples generated by ASAS center around the boundary 
to be characterized. The second technique provides that the sample points are well 
distributed and highly resolved throughout the operating range of interest. These two 
techniques are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The fom'ard path at the top of Figure 3.1 per­
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forms the setup of the operating conditions via a power flow solution and then simulates 
the contingency. The contingency simulation tool interfaces with other ASAS software 
in a modular way so that one can replace it with software appropriate for analysis of the 
problem under study. The decision of which operating points to model is made in the 
two feedback loops at the bottom of Figure 3.1. The outer loop uses Structured Monte 
Carlo sampling to lead ASAS on a predefined "trajectorv*" of operating states in terms 
of all but one operating parameter. The one remaining operating parameter, called the 
search parameter, is varied in the inner loop to generate several samples on both sides 
of the boundary- for each operating state. 
3.2.2 Data preparation 
As neural networks can do well in interpolation but not in extrapolation, it is im­
portant to guide the data generation to capture the breadth of the operating range. 
Attempts to use the neural network outside this operating range will result in decreased 
accuracy or even misleading output. 
3.2.2.1 Choice of Critical Parameter Candidates 
Data preparation for ASAS requires that the engineer first classify certain precon-
tingency parameters, as described below. 
Critical parameter candidates (CPCs) 
These are the precontingenc\- operating parameters that are expected to be good 
predictors of the performance measure. This is equivalent to saving that they are ex­
pected to be influential with respect to the postcontingency system performance. They 
are chosen by the engineer using judgment, experience with the system, and physical un­
derstanding of the security problem. They can be any parameter that can be monitored 
•21 
by the operator in the control center, including generation levels, load levels, voltage 
magnitudes, line flows, and unit commitment (i.e.. unit status). The engineer should 
overselect CPCs: if there is doubt about whether a parameter should be a CPC. then it 
should be included as a CPC. The vector of all CPCs is denoted as x = [xi, x?. • • • • 
where T indicates the vector transpose operation. 
Independent critical parameter candidates (ICPCs) 
These are critical parameter candidates that can be directly controlled by the analyst 
when running a power flow program, i.e.. they are input data to a power flow calculation. 
E.\amples include MW generation levels, real or reactive load levels or load power factors, 
unit commitment (i.e., unit status), and PV bus voltage levels. E.xamples of parameters 
that could not be ICPCs are circuit flows, PQ bus voltage magnitudes, bus voltage 
angles, and reactive generation. There are two special kinds of ICPCs: 
1. Controllable ICPCs: It is important that at least one of the ICPCs be controllable 
by the operator in order to provide for corrective action guidance, i.e.. the boundar\-
displayed to the operator should be characterized by at least one parameter that the 
operator can directly control, not to manoeuver the boundary, but to manoeuver 
the operating point with respect to the boundary-. Controllable ICPCs include 
MW generation levels and PV bus voltage levels. Load levels are generally not 
controllable. 
2. Search parameter zi: The search parameter is varied in an intelligent fashion to 
generate operating points on both sides (secure side and insecure side) of the 
boundary to be characterized. This will be explained more fully later. The search 
parameter must be a continuous valued ICPC. 
The ICPCs are denoted as z = [ci, ^ 2, • • -, Note that the vector z is a subset 
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of the vector x. i.e.. z C x. 
Dependent critical parameter candidates (DCPCs) 
All CPCs that are not ICPCs are dependent critical parameter candidates (DCPCs). 
These include PQ bus voltage magnitudes and angles, PV bus reactive injections and 
line flows. They are computed as the solution to a power flow computation. 
3.2.2.2 Operating range, simulation time, and hypercell identification 
Having identified the CPCs and the ICPCs. there are four steps to preparing the 
data: 
1. Identify the number of simulations allowable to generate the data. This can be 
estimated by running one complete simulation using ASAS and measuring the 
simulation time. Di\'ide the desired time to generate the data (e.g.. one day) by 
the simulation time. 
2. Define the operating range for the problem under study. This is done by identifying 
the operating range for each ICPC as the credible minimum Ct.mm and maximum 
^i,max v-alues for that parameter. 
3. Identify the search parameter and denote it as ci. 
4. Define the desired resolution for each ICPC. This is how many different \-alues 
of the parameter will be chosen for each complete cycle through the range for 
that parameter. Parameters expected to be most influential with respect to the 
performance measure should have the highest resolution. The basic idea for the 
procedure is to assign the resolution for each parameter according to the influential 
capability of the parjimeter on the performance measure and the desired number 
of simulations. In other words, the higher resolution is assigned to the parameter 
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with higher influential capability and the estimated simulation time should be less 
than the desired simulation time. 
3.2.3 Boundary search 
In this section, the inner loop of Figure 3.1 is described. The action of this loop 
results in boundary- centered data generation, i.e.. the data to be used to train the 
neural network will be centered about the boundary-. In other words, there will exist 
samples corresponding to operating points on both sides of the boundar\-. This is de­
sirable because it ultimately causes the neural network mapping function to retain high 
accuracy for operating points close to the boundary- but to slightly decreiise in accuracy 
as operating points become more distant from the boundar}". Loss of accuracy for points 
distant from the boundary is not of concern because only solutions on the boundar\- are 
revealed to the operator. 
3.2.3.1 Search algorithm 
The algorithm requires definition of a state. A state is a specified operating condition 
in terms of all ICPCs except the search parameter, i.e., it is a unique choice of \-alues 
for -2: -3; —• zxt.. For each state, the search parameter is varied back and forth across 
the boundarv* until the performance measure is within a tolerance of the threshold level 
corresponding to the boundary-. A secant root finding method [50] was initially used 
in the search algorithm, but we found it unattractive due to its uni-directional solution 
approach, i.e., it does not move back and forth across the boundary-. Therefore, a 
bisection method is used instead. 
3.2.3.2 Nonconverged precontingency operating conditions 
It is possible that a precontingency operating condition, as defined by a state together 
with a specific value of the search parameter, may result in a nonconverged power flow 
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solution. For each state, the search algorithm begins by simulating the contingency under 
two operating conditions distinguished by the \-alues of the search parameter: ci.mm 
and 2i,mox- In setting up the precontingency operating conditions, if nonconvergence is 
detected at both extremes, then the algorithm moves to a new state. If nonconvergence is 
detected at one extreme but the case solves at the other extreme, then the algorithm uses 
the bisection method to find a converged case that is on the opposite side of the boundary-
from the first solved case. Then, the algorithm continues with a second bisection method 
initiated from the two identified solved cases to search for the boundary-. 
3.2.3.3 Unacceptable precontingency conditions 
Even when the precontingency power flow solution converges, it is possible that it 
may violate an operating limit such as circuit overload or a bus voltage minimum or 
maximum limit. This situation is detected via the program MONITOR. This program 
requires specification by the user of the precontingency constraints of concern, i.e.. ASAS 
does not check all limits by default. 
In the developed approach for handling this situation, it is taken into considera­
tion that the data is generated only for characterizing the postcontingency performance 
for the specific contingency of interest. Therefore, the fact is simply identified that a 
precontingency violation occured, but the search continues with respect to the security 
boundarv- for the contingency of interest. The user must check to discern whether the 
precontingency violation is more constraining than the security boundary-. If it is, the 
precontingency constraint needs to be modeled in the \*isualization software. 
3.2.3.4 No solution in performance evaluation 
It is possible that the operating condition is both convergent and acceptable, but 
the simulation fails to yield a performance measure. This may occur, for example, when 
studv-ing a thermal overload problem and the postcontingency power flow fails to con­
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verge, or when studying voltage instability using P-\' or Q-V "nose" curve analysis 
and the program may fail to fully get around the nose. In this case, AS.A.S moves to 
a new search parameter value and tries again to obtain a performance \-alue for this state. 
3.2.4 Revised Latin hypercube sampling 
The outer loop of Figure 3.1 represents the portion of AS AS designed to select 
the states, where a state is a specific selection of all independent critical parameter 
candidates (ICPC) c-i, • • •.-a/, except for the search parameter ri. as defined above. 
The objective is to obtain sample data points that cover the breadth of the operating 
range, but with the best possible resolution. A revised Latin hypercube technique is 
used to accomplish this. This technique is described below. 
3.2.4.1 The uniform sampling 
Obtaining sample data points for the entire operating range is straightforward. With 
the state operating range defined by < ^i.max- V / 7^ L it is divided into cells 
(two dimensions, Z2 and C3), cubes (three dimensions, zo, Z3. and C4). or. most generally, 
hv-percubes (four or more dimensions). There are rii designated intervals for each r,, with 
each interval spanning {zi,max — The number of states is equal to the number 
of hypercubes. given by A step-by-step advancement is initiated in which 
a simulation is performed and a sample data point is obtained for each h\-percube. This 
approach requires a decision regarding which point in each hypercube to sample. One 
simple approach here would be to sample the center of each hv*percube. This approach 
guarantees a uniform distribution of sampled data points. 
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3.2.4.2 The revised Latin hypercube sampling 
This part of the approach is motivated by the assumption that neural network accu­
racy, for a given number of data sample points, is best when each parameter is maximally 
resolved, i.e.. when, for each parameter, the number of different values equals the num­
ber of different points. Figure 3.2 illustrates uniform sampling (i.e.. without the .Monte 
Carlo sampling), where each parameter is not maximally resolved, i.e., there are nine 
points but only three values per parameter: 100. 200, and 300 for r-j and 200. 400. and 
600 for C3. 
600. 
z3 
400 6 •(:) 
^ Q Q 
200 
100 200 300 
Figure 3.2 Uniform sampling in two dimensions. 
The latin hv-percube sampling [87, pp. 553-555] is a mixture of random and sys­
tematic sampling to ensure that each interval of a parameter is visited by exactly one 
Monte Carlo sampling. However, it is not guaranteed that each h\-percube is also visited 
by exactly one Monte Carlo sampling. In consideration of this fact, a revised Latin 
h\-percube sampling is proposed to achieve the maximum resolution for each parameter 
when deciding which point within each hv-percube to sample. Figiire 3.3 illustrates this 
approach for the two-dimensional case. One notes here that Z2 and ^3 each take on nine 
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Figure 3.3 Revised Latin hypercube sampling in two dimensions. 
different values instead of only three. 
If the number of points is infinite, the Monte Carlo procedure is guaranteed to obtain 
a uniform distribution of values for each interval of each parameter. Although the 
number of points is t\-pically large, this number must, of course, be finite. Therefore, 
there is always the risk that some regions of some parameters are never sampled while 
the other regions are highly sampled. This problem can be eliminated for a certain ICPC 
by choosing a large number of intervals n,. However, this could result in an excessive 
number of simulations. In order to avoid excessive simulations while increasing the 
number of intervals for one ICPC, one or more other ICPCs are identified as secondarj* 
and the number of intervals rii is chosen to be 1 for these ICPCs. Secondary- ICPCs 
should be of less influence with respect to the s}'stem performance measure. For each 
state, then, the \-alue of a secondare- ICPC is chosen at random from the entire operating 
range of the parameter. Therefore, secondary ICPCs will var\- from state to state, but 
their inclusion will not increase the number of simulations. 
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3.2.5 Data generation for the sample system 
3.2.5.1 Thermal overload 
For the thermal overload problem, 32 critical parameter candidates were selected. 
These included 4 independent critical parameter candidates (the subarea load and 3 
generations) and 28 dependent critical parameter candidates. The subarea load, gen­
eration B. and generation C were divided into 8. 7, and 7 intervals, respectively. The 
search parameter was generation A. The four external generators were each divided into 
one interval, i.e.. the full operating range. The purpose of var\-ing e.xternal dispatch was 
not to capture the influence of these particular generators but to capture the influence of 
\-ariation on the subarea tie lines, so the importance of the external generator resolutions 
was secondar\\ A total of 2568 power flow simulations were run and a data set of 1005 
samples was obtained. 
3.2.5.2 Voltage instability 
For this problem, 5 more critical parameter candidates were added that were related 
to the a\-ailable reactive supply close to the load bus that was being studied {Qmax ^'alues 
of 5 groups of generators). For example. Qmax of generator group 1 was the available 
reactive supply of this group of generators with real power generation .4. There were 
three identical units in this group. Values of Qmax depended on how many units were 
commited. Therefore, Qmax ^*as not a continuously-valued parameter. In this Ccise, the 
search parameter could not be generation .4 because variation in real power generation 
would require the Qmax of group 1 also change. This would result in two parameter 
changes, which would make the boundary search a very complicated procedure. There­
fore, the subarea load was chosen as the search parameter. Generations .4, B, and C 
were each divided into 9, 7, and 8 intervals, respectively. The four external generators 
were also each divided into one interval, i.e., the full operating range. A total of 16000 
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power flow simulations were run and a data set of 8000 samples has been obtained by 
traversing the 504 (9 x 7 x 8) states four times. These samples were divided into three 
parts: 
1. The first 2000 samples, which corresponded to one full traversal through the 504 
states, were used as input to the feature selection software. 
2. The first 6000 samples, which corresponded to three full traversals through the 
504 .states, were used for neural network training. 
3. The last 2000 samples, which corresponded to one full traversal through the 504 
states, were used for neural network test. 
3.3 Data analysis 
The purpose of data analysis is to analyze the data to ensure that data coverage of 
the problem space is appropriate for neural network training. In data generation, outliers 
are likely to occur if am* module is imperfect. During on-line use. the new operating 
point might be an outlier with respect to the training data. Therefore, it is useful to 
detect outliers in either case. 
3.3.1 Techniques for outlier detection 
There is no formal, widely accepted, definition of what is meant by an outlier. An 
informal, intuitive definition is that an outlier is a data point that is inconsistent with 
the remainder of the data set [74, Chapter 10]. For power sj-stem security assessment, an 
outlier is a data point that is far away from other data points: it is an at>-pical operating 
point. 
Outlier detection is useful for neural network training and prediction. During train­
ing, if an outlier appears in the training data set, it may influence the neural network 
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training and cause performance inaccuracy. During prediction, i.e.. wlien a trained neu­
ral network is used for prediction, if a new data point is an outlier with respect to the 
training data set. the trained neural network may output a misleading result. This is 
because neural networks tend to perform well in data interpolation but not in extrapo­
lation. 
For a one-dimensional data set, it is relatively easy to detect outliers by direct ob­
servation of data or by simple calculation. In case of multi-dimensional data set. more 
advanced methods are needed because the data can not be readily plotted to pinpoint 
the outliers. 
3.3.1.1 Principal component analysis 
The central idea of principal component analysis (PCA) [74. 75] is to reduce the 
dimensionality of a data set in which there are a large number of interrelated variables, 
while retaining maximum information content. Specifically. PCA searches for a few un-
correlated linear combinations of the original variables that capture most of the variation 
in the original \-ariables. 
Suppose that x is a vector of p random variables. The first step is to find a linear 
transformation which has ma-ximum rariance from all values of vector x. where qi 
is a vector of p constants, au, ai2, • • •, Qip, so that 
Xext, find a linear transformation qJx, uncorrelated with qJ^x, which has maximum 
variance, and so on. The Arth derived variable ajx, uncorrelated with aj'x. ajx. - • •. 
aJ_iX. is the A:th principal component. At most p PCs can be found, but it is hoped 
that most of the variation in x will be accounted for by m PCs. where m <?C p. It can be 
derived that the Arth PC is given by Zk = a^x where Q|c is an eigenvector of the sample 
p 
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covariance matrix given by 
S  =  ^ ( x . - x ) ( x , - x ) ^  ( 3 . 3 )  
-  1  i = i  
corresponding to its Arth largest eigenvalue A. Furthermore, if aic is chosen to have unit 
length (a^Qk = 1), then the variance of Zk is A^. The deriv-ation of the above result can 
be found in reference [74. pp. 4-5]. 
The plot of the first two principal components may reveal some important features of 
the data set. This is because the plot is equivalent to a projection of the multidimensional 
data swarm onto the plane that shows the largest spread of the points. The resulting 
two-dimensional representation captures more of the overall configuration of the data 
than does a plot of any two of the original variables [75]. If the first two principal 
components account for a major portion of the total \'ariation of the data set. then the 
2-D representation of the p-dimensioncil data set can be examined for outliers. In general, 
the first two principal components tend to detect the outliers that inflate variances or 
cov-ariances, where these outliers are more likely detectable by plotting the original 
variables. On the other hand, the last two principal components may provide additional 
information that is not available in plots of the original variables [74. Chapter 10]. 
The above method has been applied to the data sets for the thermal overload problem 
and the voltage instabiUty problem. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the accumulative \-ariation 
that is the sum of variations of indi\"idual principal components. For the thermal over­
load problem, it can be seen that the first two principal components account for 71.5% 
of the total variation. Then, the first two principal components are plotted as shown in 
Figure 3.6. The last two principal components are shown in Figure 3.7. From the plots, 
no outliers are observed. For the voltage instability problem, the same method can not 
be used for outlier detection because the first two PCs account for only 35.5% of the 
total variation. 
To assess the effectiveness of the principal component analysis method, sample 10 
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in the data set for the thermal overload problem was altered. The Subarea Load. Gen­
eration .4. Generation B. and Generation C were changed from 0.7670. 1.0000, 0.9764. 
0.0822 to 1.0000, 0.0000. 0.0000. 0.0000 in per unit, respectively. The new sample 10 
means that the Subarea Load was at its maximum, but no local generations were avail­
able in this subarea. This situation was not in accordance with the others so that it was 
an outlier. For the new data set, the first and last two principal components are shown 
in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. It can be seen that sample 10 is not detectable by plotting 
the first two principal components, but it is standing out as an outlier in the plot for 
the last two principal components. 
The principal component analysis method is appropriate for analyzing the training 
data set. but it is not appropriate for on-line determining whether a new sample is an 
outlier or not because of its computational time. 
Principal components 
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Figure 3.4 Accumulative variation of principal components for the thermal 
overload problem. 
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Figure 3.5 Accumulative variation of principal components for the voltage 
instability problem. 
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Figure 3.6 The first two principal components for the thermal overload 
problem with the original data set. 
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Figure 3.7 The last two principal components for the thermal overload 
problem with the original data set. 
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Figure 3.8 The first two principal components for the thermal overload 
problem with the altered data set. 
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Figure 3.9 The last two principal components for the thermal overload 
problem with the altered data set. 
3.3.1.2 Local training data density estimation 
One can estimate the training data density around a given data point using the k-
nearest neighbor method. If this local data density is below a given value, this data 
point is identified as one that lies outside the range of the training data set. This is 
particularly useful when the trained neural network is used to predict the result for a 
new data point, as would be the case when boundaries are drawn for on-line security 
assessment. If the new data point is an outlier, the neural network output is not reliable. 
For a given point (e.g., the current operating point), the outlier detection algorithm 
identifies the N nearest neighbors within the training data, and then computes the av­
erage dist£ince from the given point to these N nearest neighbors where N is determined 
by experience. The distance between the given point and one of the N nearest neighbors 
(a training point) is computed as the Euclidean distance. That is, if one denotes the 
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given point by p = {pipo—PmY" and the i-th nearest neighbor as qi = [?a9t2-"9«mF where 
the elements of each vector are the normalized values of the critical parameters used to 
characterize the security problem, then the distance between the given point p and the 
2-th nearest neighbor q, is 
= Hp  —  Q z i l  =  \J (Pl — 9a)' + (P2 — 9.2)" + — + [Pm — Qim)' 
and the average distance is given by 
The local training data density is defined as 
1 
This method has been applied to the voltage instability problem. From the test data 
of 2.000 samples that were not used for the neural network training, a sample set of 219 
data points was drawn and the neural network test error against the local training data 
density was plotted. total of 19 points were generated outside the range of training 
data set so that they were considered to be outliers. .A. test on these 19 points was also 
performed. Figure 3.10 pro\-ides a plot of error against p for each of the 19 outliers and 
for each of the 219 test data points with S = 50. The circles represent the outliers and 
the crosses represent the 219 test data points. 
In Figure 3.10. the crosses are concentrated in the lower right portion of the plot, 
indicating that, for these test data points, the local training data density is relatively high 
and the neural network error is relatively small. In contrast, the circles are concentrated 
on the upper left portion of the plot, indicating that, for the outliers, the density is 
relatively low and the neural network error is relatively large. These two results indicate 
that neural network error and the local training data densitj* are related: the lower the 
density, the greater will be the error. From the plot, we see that as long as the density is 
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Figure 3.10 Error versus density in training data 
greater than about 1.7 the error will be less than 20% (of 200 MVAr). This provides us 
with a rule for assessing the reliability of the neural network evaluation for a new data 
point: compute the density p and determine whether this density is greater than 1.7: 
if so, the resulting boundar>' should be identified as potentially inaccurate. The local 
training data density method is appropriate for on-line use because it is fast. 
3.3.1.3 Multivariate normality test 
A procedure based on the standardized distance from each sample point x, to the 
sample mean point x 
D; = (x.- - x)^S"^(x£ - x) 
can be used to detect which data point is a possible outlier, where S is the sample 
covariance matrix defined as 
1 n 
^\T S = ^(Xi - x)(x. - x) 
" - 1 
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If the Xj's are multix-ariate normal, then 
nDr 
U i  =  
' in - 1)^ 
has a 3 distribution where n is the number of samples. The Uj s are ranked ascendingly 
and then the quantiles of the 3 distribution 
I — a 
u, = 
' n — a — + 1 
are calculated where 
Q = P - 2 
2p 
3= 
2 ( n - p -  1 )  
Quantiles are similar to the more familiar percentiles, which are expressed in terms 
of percent: a test score at the 90th percentile, for example, is above 90% of the test 
scores and below 10% of them. Quantiles are expressed in terms of fractions or pro­
portions. Thus the 90th percentile score becomes the 0.9 quantile score. Finally, the 
Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot of (f^. u,) is obtained. The Q-Q plot is a graphical way to 
compare two distribution functions Fi and Fo with regard to their shape. It is simply a 
plot of points whose x-coordinate is the pth quantile of Fi and whose y-coordinate is the 
pth quantile of Fo. The relationship between Fi and Fj can be revealed by the shape of 
the Q-Q plot. For example, the Q-Q plot will be a straight line through the origin with 
slope of 1 if Fi and Fo are the same; it will still be a straight line with different slope 
and intercept if Fi and Fo differ only in scale and location. For details about Q-Q plots, 
see reference [75. pp. 105-107]. From the Q-Q plot of (t'i.Ui), it can be obser\-ed that 
a departure from nonnalitv- occurs if a nonlinear pattern exists in the plot. A formal 
significant test is also a\-ailable for = maxDf, but with only low dimensional data 
sets. With high dimensional data sets, we can first check if there is a significant change 
on D~'s: if yes, outliers possibly occur and then the Q-Q plot can be used to confirm. 
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Figure 3.11 shows the plot of D f ' s  for the thermal overload problem with 1.005 
samples. It can be seen that there is one data point (top right comer of Figure 3.11) 
which makes a significant change on Dps. This data point will be referred to as sample 
265. Therefore, sample 265 is a possible outlier. Figure 3.12 shows the corresponding 
Q-Q plot of {t'i, Ui). From the plot, it can be seen that sample 265 stands out clearly. 
Therefore, it is an outlier with respect to a normality distribution. In other words, one 
can say that the data distribution is not normal with respect to sample 265. Figure 3.13 
shows the Q-Q plot of (vi. u,) for the same problem with sample 265 removed. 
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Figure 3.11 Plot of D f s  for the thermal overload data set with 1,005 sam­
ples 
For the voltage instability problem, Dj's were also calculated and there was no 
significant change found. Thus, no outliers in the data set were identified. 
The multivariate normality test Cein be used to determine whether or not the distri­
bution of the training data set is normal. 
3.3.1.4 Kohonen self-organizing map 
Kohonen self-organizing map [77, Chapter 10] attempts to represent a data set by 
a smcdler data set, by reducing either the number of input patterns or the niunber of 
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Figure 3.12 Q-Q plot of Ui and Ui for the thermal overload data set with 
1,005 samples 
Figure 3.13 Q-Q plot of Vi and u, for the thermal overload data set with 
1,004 samples (sample 265 removed) 
41 
attributes while topologically preserving similarities present in the input vectors. It 
belongs to the class of unsupervised learning algorithms that are complementarv- to the 
classical statistical nonparametric data analysis techniques. 
The learning algorithm of the Kohonen self-organizing map can be described as 
follows: 
1. Initialization: Set random values for the initial weights w^(0).7 = 1. • • •. .V where 
.V is the number of neurons in the map. 
2. Sampling: Choose an input sample x randomly from the training data set. 
3. Similarity matching: Find the best-matching (winning) neuron i(x) at time n. 
using the minimum Euclidean distance criterion: 
i(x) = argj min llx(n)-Wjij. j = (3.4) 
4. Updating: Adjust the weight vectors of all neurons, using the update formula 
Wj(n) + ;7(n)[x(n) - Wj(n)], j G 
w_,(n-l- l )  =  (3.5) 
•Wj{n). otherv\ise 
where ri{n) is the learning rate, and Ai(x)(n) is the neighborhood function centered 
around the winning neuron /(x): both of the peirameters are \-aried dynamically 
during learing. 
5. Continuation: Continue with Step 2 until no noticeable changes in the map are 
observed. 
The procedure to use a Kohonen self-organizing map to detect outliers is as follows: 
• Use the training data set to train a Kohonen self-organizing map so that a topologj-
preserving 2-D grid is formed. 
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• Observe whether there are isolated points in the 2-D grid. If yes. these isolated 
points correspond to the outliers in the training data set. 
A 10x10 grid is chosen to represent the Kohonen network. Any data point is mapped 
to one of the nodes in the network. Figures 3.14 and 3.15 are the maps for the thermal 
overload problem (1.005 samples) and voltage instability problem (2.000 samples). One 
could not find any isolated node in the maps, therefore no outlier could be identified 
using this method. 
The main advantage of the Kohonen self-organizing map lies in its graphical inter­
pretation capability. Also, the number of neurons is independent of the dimension of 
the input vector and of the size of the training data set. However, there is no theoretical 
guidance in choosing the appropriate number of neurons in the map. 
3.3.2 Techniques for outlier detection and distribution visualization 
While it is important to do outlier detection for the training data set, meanwhile, it 
must be ensured that the training data set provides an accurate representation of the 
entire problem space. The actual distribution of the parameters may be not uniform or 
well-resolved due to \*arious practical limitations such as constraints among parameters, 
simulation tool limitations, or unrealistic situations leading to power flow nonconver-
gence. The following techniques can not only detect outliers but also visualize the data 
distribution. 
3.3.2.1 Scatter plots 
1-D scatter plots 
These plots can provide an intuitive feeling about the range and distribution of an 
attribute. They eilso help to detect possible outliers. These plots have been obtained 
for the thermal overload problem and the voltage instability problem. In the plots, 
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each point corresponds to each sample. If there are multiple samples with the same 
value for the plotted parameter, then the multiple points are evenly plotted at that 
\'alue. Figures 3.16 and fig:al9 are two examples. It can be observed that the overall 
distribution is good (i.e.. the entire problem space is covered) although sample 996 is 
slightly far away from other sample points. 
2-D scatter plots 
These plots can provide a graphical interpretation on whether the data set is well 
distributed throughout the problem space. Two kinds of plots can be obtained. One 
is a plot of attributes versus the performance measure. The other is a plot of a pair 
of attributes. The plots have been obtained for the thermal overload problem and the 
voltage instability problem. Figures 3.18-3.21 are some of them. 
3-D trajectory' plots 
These plots can provide a dynamic visualization on ASAS procedures, i.e.. how the 
training dat set is generated. Figure 3.22 shows a trajector\- inside a 3-D space repre­
senting the three precontingency critical parameters. 
3.3.2.2 Projection pursuit visualization 
The 1-D, 2-D, and 3-D plots have been obtained for the data distribution analysis 
over the problem space. However, these plots can only pro\ide certain views on data 
distribution. An obvious remedy is to look at the high-dimensional point clouds, and base 
the description of the structure on these views. As humcin perception in more than three 
dimensions is difficult, the dimensionality has to be reduced, most simply, by projection. 
Since projection of the data generally implies loss of information, multivariate structure 
does not usually show up in all projections, and no single projection might contain cill 
the information. Therefore, it is important to judiciously choose the set of projections 
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on which the structure shows up. The projection pursuit visualization [84, 85] uses the 
gradient of a projection pursuit function to visualize the high-dimensional data set from 
various interesting views in order to search for structures in high-dimensional space. The 
resulting plots are two-dimensional data clouds where the two coordinate axes represent 
two projection directions and each point corresponds to a sample. 
Figures 3.23 - 3.25 are examples of views for the thermal overload with the original 
data set. Figures 3.26 - 3.28 are examples of views for the thermal overload with the 
altered data set. It can be observed that the data distribution for the thermal overload 
problem is good. But sample 996 is an outlier for the original and altered data sets. 
Sample 10, as expected, is an outlier for the altered data set. Figure 3.29 is an e.xample 
of views for the voltage instability problem. It can also be seen that the data distribution 
for the voltage instability problem is good. 
The projection pursuit visualization method is an effective tool for interactively an­
alyzing the training data set. 
3.4 Summary 
Data generation and data analysis have been discussed in this chapter. In data gen­
eration, a systematic approch has been developed to automatically generate a database 
for any tj-pe of security problem by using the correponding simulation tool. The de­
veloped software uses boundary search and revised Latin hvTJercube sampling to ensure 
that the generated sample points are centered around the boundary- and they are highly 
resolved and well distributed. Various data sets have been generated for the thermal 
overload and voltage instability problems. 
Data anal\-sis techniques are used to anal>*ze the training data set to ensure that 
the data coverage of the problem space is appropriate for neural network training and 
prediction. Two aspects have been investigated: outlier detection and distribution anal­
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ysis. The techniques for outlier detection are the principal component analysis, the 
local training data density estimation, the multivariate normality test, the Kohonen 
self-organizing map. the scatter plots, and the projection pursuit visualization. Of the 
above, the scatter plots and the projection pursuit visualization can also be used to 
analyze data distribution. The local training data density estimation is appropriate for 
determining whether a new sample is an outlier with respect to the training data set. 
All of the other methods are most appropriate for analyzing the training data set before 
neural network training, and they are complementar>- to each other. .A.s a general proce­
dure. start with the principal component analysis, then use the multi\'ariate normality 
test, finally do the projection pursuit visualization. At the same time, the scatter plots 
can be used as a simple tool for data analysis. The Kohonen self-organizing map is not 
recommended unless one can choose a reasonable number of neurons on the map. 
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Figure 3.14 Organization of a Kohonen self-organizing map for the thermal 
overload problem 
Figure 3.15 Orgaiiization of a Kohonen self-organizing map for the voltage 
instability problem 
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Figure 3.16 Attribute 18 (voltage magnitude) for the thermal overload 
problem. 
Figure 3.17 Attribute 19 (voltage magnitude) for the thermal overload 
problem. 
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Figure 3.18 Attribute 17 (line flow) versus subarea load for the thermal 
overload problem. 
Var2 
Figure 3.19 Voltage magnitude 7 versus subarea load for the thermal over­
load problem. 
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Figure 3.20 Voltage magnitude 9 versus subarea load for the thermal over­
load problem. 
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Figure 3.21 Generation A versus subarea load for the thermal overload 
problem. 
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Figure 3.24 A view of data for the thermal overload problem with the orig­
inal data set. 
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Figure 3.25 A view of data for the thermal overload problem with the orig­
inal data set. 
Figure 3.26 A view of data for the thermal overload problem with the al­
tered data set. 
Figure 3.27 A view of data for the thermal overload problem with the al­
tered data set. 
Figure 3.28 A \"iew of data for the thermal overload problem with the al­
tered data set. 
Figiire 3.29 A view of data for the voltage instability problem. 
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4 FEATURE SELECTION 
4.1 Introduction 
Security assessment studies have traditionally depended on engineering judgment to 
select the critical parameters, i.e.. to select the parameters to be used in characterizing 
the boundar\' for each security problem. The goal of this chapter is to develop an au­
tomatic approach to select critical parameters from the critical parameter candidates. 
More specifically, the goal is to select the best critical parameters for the entire op­
erating range, not necessarily for any one particular operating point. Once candidate 
critical parameters have been selected and a database has been generated, this becomes 
a standard feature selection problem. It is not intended that automatic feature selection 
will replace the engineering judgment, but rather it is intended that it will enrich the 
judgment by confirming and extending physical understanding. 
Feature selection is a process to identify a subset of the initial attributes, which 
are also called features or parameters. The words attribute, feature, and parameter 
will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. It can be thought of as a search 
problem over the space of all combinations of features where a function is used to evaluate 
what is "best". Also, it may be possible to combine and mathematically transform the 
original attributes so that one can obtain new attributes that condense the maximum 
discriminatorv- information from the available data. This is so called feature extraction. 
In this dissertation, no distinction between these two cases, feature selection and feature 
extraction, is treated: both are called feature selection. 
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Following a brief literature overview in the next section three classes of feature 
selection methods are discussed: cluster analysis, Kohonen self-organizing map, and 
genetic algorithm based methods. 
4.2 Literature overview 
As indicated in reference [61], researchers in the statistics and pattern recognition 
communities have investigated feature subset selection problems for decades [51. 52. 53, 
54. 55, 56], but most work has concentrated on subset selection using linear regression, 
which is not verv- effective for highly non-linear problems. However, some statistical 
methods, such as principal component analysis, are still useful for analyzing some rela­
tionships among features. Zayan et al. [63] have compared the minimum entropy method 
and the Karhunen — Loeve expansion method for dynamic security classification and 
concluded that the former is better. Muknahallipatna et al. [64] have compared the 
linear correlation method and discriminant analysis and found that the latter is better. 
In the machine learning literature, the most closely related work is MLC++ software^ 
and Predict software [57]. MLC+-1- uses a statistical method to search solution space. 
The Predict software, in a way similar to [58], uses the genetic algorithm to search the 
solution space. Downey et al. [59] also use the genetic algorithm to search the solution 
space but use a statistical method to do the evaluation. 
The selection of attributes is based only on the ability to predict the output. There 
is no efficient way to account for cardinality constraints on the feature set although there 
are several techniques that have attempted to find minimimi feature subsets (see [62] 
for a discussion). Furthermore, there is no capability to preselect some features into the 
solution. Therefore, a genetic algorithm based neural network feature selection tool was 
developed in [61] and refined in this dissertation. 
'This machine learning software was developed by Stanford University and is a\-ailable in the public 
domain. 
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4.3 Critical parameter candidates for the sample system 
In the sample as introduced in Chapter 1. there are 32 critical parameter candidates 
for the thermal overload problem and 37 critical parameter candidates for the voltage 
instability problem. They are listed in Table 4.1. The objective of feature selection is 
to select critical parameters from these candidates. 
Table 4.1 Critical parameter candidates for the thermal overload and volt­
age instability problems 
.Attribute Thermal Voltage .Attribute Thermal Voltage 
number overload instability number overload instability 
1 Gen.\ Gen.A. 20 Volt3 Volt3 
2 Load Load 21 Vblt4 Volt4 
3 Gen2 Gen2 22 Volt5 VoltS 
4 Gen3 Gen3 23 V'olt6 Volt6 
5 Flowl Flowl 24 Volt 7 Volt7 
6 Flow2 Flow2 25 Volts Volt8 
7 FIow3 Flow3 26 Volt9 Volt9 
8 Flow4 Flow4 27 Volt 10 Volt 10 
9 Flow5 Flow5 28 Volt 11 Volt 11 
10 Flow6 Flow6 29 Volt 12 Volt 12 
11 FIow7 Flow7 30 Volt 13 Volt 13 
12 Flow8 Flow8 31 Volt 14 Volt 14 
13 Flow9 Flow9 32 Flow 14 Flow 14 
14 Flow 10 Flow 10 33 Qma.xl 
15 Flow 11 Flow 11 34 Qmax2 
16 Flow 12 Flow 12 35 Qmax3 
17 Flow 13 Flow 13 36 Qmax4 
18 Vbltl Voltl 37 Qmax5 
19 Volt2 Volt2 
4.4 Statistical method - Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis [73] can be used to anedyze similarities or dissimilarities among 
groups of objects, i.e., patterns (Q-analysis) or attributes (R-analysis). There are many 
cluster analysis methods in statistics. Hierarchical cluster analysis is one which results 
in a tree or dendrogram showing the hierarchy of similarities among all pairs of objects. 
According to [73, p.21], hierarchical cluster anal\*sis is more widely used than nonhier-
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archical cluster analysis such as the k-means clustering method because of its simplicity 
in mathematics and its effectiveness in practice. The general procedure for hierarchical 
cluster analysis is as follows: 
• Form a data matrix: The columns represent attributes and the rows represent 
patterns. 
• Normalize the data matrix: Normalize the data so that attributes contribute more 
equally to the similarity calculation. For example, if the range of values on the first 
attribute is much greater than the range of \-alues of the second, the first attribute 
will cany more weight in determining the similarities among objects. 
• Compute similarities between pairs of objects: Use a distance measure (e.g., Eu­
clidean) to compute similarities between pairs. 
• Execute a clustering method to produce a tree or dendrogram: Show the hierarchy 
of similarities between peiirs of patterns or attributes using a tree or dendrogram. 
This is especially applicable to attribute similarity analysis or when the number of 
patterns is not large so that one can clearly plot the clustering tree. 
The hierarchical cluster analysis has been applied to the data set for the thermal 
overload and voltage instability problems. The clustering tree for the thermal overload 
problem is shown in Figure 4.1. One can see that the attributes form several clusters ac­
cording to their similarities. The result is reasonable in terms of physical interpretations 
of these attributes. For example, attributes 9 (Flow5) and 17 (FlowlS), 10 (Flow6) and 
11 (Flow?) are flows of circuits in series, respectively, and attributes 16 (Flowr2) and 
32 (Flowl4) are flows of a transformer and a line in series. As to attributes 13 (FIow9) 
and 14 (FlowlO), they are effectively in parallel from inspection of the one-line diagram 
and obser\-ation of power flow variations. The plot shows that the two attributes in each 
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Figure 4.1 Cluster tree for the data set of the thermal overload problem 
pair are located closely in the tree. Attributes 18 (Voltl) to 31 (Voltl4) are all of the 
bus voltages located in the same region of the system. 
Figure 4.2 shows the clustering tree for the voltage instability problem. One can also 
observe the similar phenomena. For example, attributes 9 (Flow5) and 17 (Flowl.3). 10 
(Flow6) and 11 (Flow?) are flows of circuits in series, respectively. 
For feature selection, a straightforvvard method based on cluster analysis is to pick up 
one attribute from each major cluster, which includes more attributes than other clusters. 
For the thermal overload problem with cardiuedity level 8, for example, attributes 5 
(Flowl), 9 (Flow5), 10 (Flow6), and 18 (Voltl) can be selected attributes in addition 
to preselected attributes 1 to 4. However, the cardinality level should be specified in 
ad^vance. 
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Figure 4.2 Cluster tree for the data set of the voltage instability problem 
4.5 Neural network method - Kohonen self-organizing map 
As discussed in Chapter 3. the Kohonen self-organizing map attempts to represent 
a data set by a smaller one, by reducing either the number of input patterns or the 
number of attributes while topologically preserving similarities present in the input 
vectors. When it is used to reduce the number of attributes, it can be \ie\ved as a 
feature selection tool. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are organized maps for the thermal overload and voltage insta­
bility problems. The number in a circle represents the number of attributes clustered. 
Table 4.2 lists each node with the associated attributes. From the maps and the table, 
it can be seen that the results are quite similar to those from cluster analysis. For in­
stance, attributes 18 through 31 for the thermal overload problem are clustered because 
they are all bus voltage magnitudes. Features 9 and 17 are clustered for both thermal 
overload and voltage instability problems. 
For feature selection, a straightforward method based on Kohonen self-organizing 
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Figure 4.3 A 4x4 organized map of attributes for the thermal overload 
problem. 
Figure 4.4 A 4x4 organized map of attributes for the voltage instability 
problem. 
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Table 4.2 Nodes on the map with their associated attributes for the thermal 
overload problem. 
Node Features (Thermal overload) Features (Voltage instability) 
1 18-31 (Voltl-Voltl4) 18-21 (Voltl-Volt4), 25 (Volt8). 26 (VoltQ), 
28-30 (Voltll-Voltl3). 34 (Qma.x2) 
2 22-24 (Volts-Volt7), 27 (VoltlO). 31 (Voltl4) 
3 9 (Flow5). 17 (Flowl3) 
4 8 (Flowl2) 13 (Flow9). 14 (FlowlO). 33 (Qma.xl) 
5 
6 16 (Flowl2) 2(Load) 
4 10 (FIow6). 32 (Flowl4) 4 (Gen3), 35 (Qmax3) 
8 6 (Flow2), 11 (Flow?) 1 (Genl) 
9 2(Load) 9 (Flow5). 16 (Flowr2). 17 (Flowl3) 
10 
11 36 (Qmax4). 37 (Qmax5) 
12 5 (Flowl), 7 (Flow3). 12 (Flow8) 
13 1 (Genl). 13 (Flow9), 14 (FlowlO) 8 (Flow4), 10 (Flow6). 32 (Flowl4) 
14 5 (Flowl). 6 (Flow2). 11 (Flow7). 12 (FlowS) 
15 3 (Gen2). 4 (Gen3) 
16 15 (Flowll) 3 (Gen2). 7 (Flow3). 15 (Flowll) 
map is to pick up one attribute from each major node, which includes more attributes 
than other nodes. For the thermal overload problem with cardinality level 8, for example, 
attributes 5 (Flowl), 9 (Flow5), 10 (Flow6), and 18 (Voltl) can be selected attributes 
in addition to preselected attributes 1 to 4. However, the cardinality level should be 
specified in advance. 
4.6 Genetic algorithm method 
The genetic algorithm (GA) [65, 66] is used to search the feature space. The e\-alua-
tion function is the fitness function which includes network accuracy, feature cardinality, 
and feature constraints such as set controllability. Figure 4.5 illustrates the basic func­
tional structure of the developed genetic algorithm based neural network feature selection 
tool (GANN), which was initially designed and implemented by Mr. Qianglin Zhao [61]. 
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4.6.1 Design of GANN 
Figure 4.5 shows the functional structure of GAXX. Since the two important com­
ponents are the search approach and the evaluation function, they are discussed first, 
and then the procedure in Figure 4.5 is explained. 
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Figure 4.5 Bcisic functional structure of GAXX 
4.6.1.1 Search Approach 
If there are n candidate features, the solution space will consist of 2" possible so­
lutions. Even if the number of candidate features can be reduced to 30 or 40 using 
engineering judgment, the solution space is still verv* large (2^° = 1.1 x 10^) so that 
exhaustive search is not practical. Genetic algorithms are ver\' effective in solving com­
binatorial problems for which a performance measure, i.e., a fitness function, can be 
defined for each combination under consideration. Therefore, the GA is used for an 
efficient search for the best subset of features. In this design, the user specifies pa­
rameters that should be forced into the solution to satisfy the feature controllability 
constraint. The user also specifies a cardinality range. The GA then identifies the most 
accurate solution containing the forced parameters for each cardinality level in the spec-
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ified range. Finally, the user can easily select the solution that offers the best tradeoff 
between accuracy and cardinality. 
4.6.1.2 Evaluation function 
The evaluation function is used in fitness calculations, as shown in Figure 4.5. to 
calculate the fitness for a possible solution. The larger the fitness, the better the feature 
subset. The fitness of the i-th individual in the population can be computed according 
to Fi = ujiFii + woF-ii where Fu and Foi are the fitness components corresponding to 
the neural network accuracy and cardinality, respectively, and wi and ito are their corre­
sponding weights. Fii is taken £is the reciprocal of the average absolute error computed 
by testing a neural network trained with inputs corresponding to the selected attributes 
of the individual. Fo, is equal to Uj, the cardinality level of individual j. if Uj is smaller 
than the desired cardinality level: otherwise, it is zero. Weights wi and wo are set to 1.0 
and 3000.0, respectively. The cardinality component is weighted much higher than the 
accuracy component and therefore dominates the early generations during evolution so 
that members in later generations are those with the desired cardinality, and evolution 
proceeds to maximize accuracy. 
4.6.1.3 Procedure of GANN 
The procedure of GANX includes the following steps: 
1. Population initialization - Randomly generate the initial population consisting of 
M members. Each member is a possible solution represented as a binar\- vector 
whose length is equal to the number of candidate features. A "1" means the feature 
is selected and a "0" means the feature is not selected. 
2. Fitness calculation - Calculate the fitness \-alue of each member in the current 
population. 
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3. Elitist strategy - Select the first N members with the largest fitness values to be 
directly placed into the next generation. 
4. Crossover - Select M — N members using roulette wheel selection to be placed 
into a mating pool. With probability proportional to fitness values, pick a pair 
of parents and perform crossover operation with a high probability to generate 
offspring. 
5. Mutation - Perform mutation operation with a low probability on the offspring to 
obtain a new generation of population. 
6. Stopping criterion check - Check the stopping criterion: if it is satisfied, stop: 
other\vise, go to step 2. A limit on the number of generations as the stopping 
criterion. E.xperience with the algorithm has resulted in a choice of 200 for this 
limit. 
4.6.1.4 Neural network 
The multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) w-ith backpropagation (BP) learning algorithm is 
used to perform the evaluation for different feature sets. In order to limit computational 
time, we use a one hidden layer neural network with only one neuron in the hidden 
layer, .\fter selection of the best features using a simple fixed neural network, we apply 
£in optimization procedure to select and train the best neural network architecture, in 
terms of the number of hidden neurons, using a fixed feature set. 
4.6.2 Application to the sample system 
For the line thermal overload problem, we ran GANN for 11 different cardinality 
levels, from 5 to 10, with parameters 1-4 forced into the solution. The results are given 
in Table 4.3. The result of cardinality level 8 is chosen because it provides the best 
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Table 4.3 Feature selection results for the line thermal overload with cardi­
nality levels 5-10 (using MLPs) 
Parameter Cardina ity Level 
Name 5 6 1 8 9 10 
Genl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Load 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gen2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gen3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Flowl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flowo 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Flow6 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Flow? 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FlowS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flowl 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Flow 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow 13 1 0 1 1 0 1 
V'oltl 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Volt2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
\blt3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V"olt4 0 0 1 1 1 0 
VoIt5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volte 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V'oltT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volts 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt9 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Volt 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Voltll 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Volt 12 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Voltl3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow 14 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Average Error 0.0315 0.0207 0.0090 0.0082 0.0084 0.0078 
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tradeoff between cardinality and error. The average error is given as a percentage of 600 
A. which is the maximum flow on the overloaded line. The results generally agree with 
engineering judgment. For example, parameters Flow5, FlowlS, and Flowl4 are selected 
the most often since these parameters represent the flows on the overloaded circuit 
FlowlS (Flow5 and FlowlS are approximately in series) and the outaged circuit (Flowl4). 
The other parameters selected for cardinality level 8 are bus voltage magnitudes near 
the overloaded or outaged circuit. 
For the voltage instability problem, we ran GANX for 5 different cardinality levels, 
from 9 to 13. with parameters 1-4 forced into the solution. The results are given in 
Table 4.4. The results also generally agree with engineering judgment. For example, pa­
rameters 33 and 36 are always selected since they represent two synchronous condensers 
close to the load bus with deficient reactive power. The result of cardinality level 11 is 
chosen because it provides the best tradeoff between cardinality and error. Here, the 
average error is given as a percentage of 200 MVAr, which is the reactive power margin 
on the the load bus with the most deficient reactive supply. 
For both problems, the critical parameters include load, generations, line flows, and 
bus voltage magnitudes. For the voltage instability problem, an additional tv-pe of 
critical parameter is a\-ailable reactive power supply. There are three a\-ailable reactive 
power supplies corresponding to three different groups of generators, Qmaxl.Qmax'l, 
and QmaxZ, each of which is the sum of the reactive capacities for the committed 
generators in that group. These values change accordingly as the unit commitment 
status in each group changes. 
It is necessary to point out that GANN is not guaranteed to give the best solution 
because of its stochastic nature and the fact that the nimiber of evolutions can not be 
infinite. However, given a finite and sufficiently large number of evolutions, it has been 
found that GANN will always produce a good solution. 
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Table 4.4 Feature selection results for the voltage instability with cardinal­
ity levels 9-13 (using MLPs) 
Pcirameter 
Name 
Cardinality Level 
9 10 11 12 13 
Genl 1 1 1 1 1 
Load 1 1 1 1 1 
Gen2 1 1 1 1 1 
Gen3 1 1 1 1 1 
Flowl 0 1 0 1 0 
Flow2 0 0 0 1 0 
Flow3 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow4 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow5 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow6 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow? 0 0 0 0 0 
FlowS 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow9 0 0 1 0 1 
Flow 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow 11 0 0 0 0 1 
Flow 12 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow 13 0 0 1 1 0 
Vbltl 0 1 0 0 0 
Volt2 0 0 0 0 0 
VoIt3 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt4 0 0 0 0 0 
Volto 0 0 0 0 1 
Volte 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt" 1 0 1 0 1 
\blt8 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt9 0 0 0 0 0 
VoltlO 0 0 0 0 1 
Volt 11 0 0 0 0 0 
Voltl2 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt 13 0 0 0 0 1 
Voltl4 1 1 1 1 1 
Qmaxl 1 1 1 1 1 
Qmax2 1 0 0 0 0 
Qmax3 0 0 1 1 0 
Qmax4 1 1 1 1 1 
Qmaxo 0 1 0 0 0 
Flow 14 0 0 0 1 0 
Average Error 0.0824 0.0742 0.0665 0.0736 0.0783 
68 
4.6.3 Improvement on solution speed 
4.6.3.1 GANN with radial basis function networks 
There are some problems when the GA is used to do feature selection where a neu­
ral network architecture with standard backpropagation (BP) algorithm is adopted to 
compute fitness. One of them is that the standard BP algorithm is verv' slow. Since 
each potential solution requires neural network training, the training speed is the most 
significant influencing factor with respect to the overall solution time. This is a ma­
jor disadvantage of using G.A. with the BP algorithm to do feature selection for neural 
networks. For instance, it took 88886 seconds of CPU time to obtain the solution for 
cardinality 8. To overcome this problem mentioned above, the BP algorithm in G.A.XX 
is replaced by a radial beisis function network with a fast training method. 
If we view the neural network design problem as a curve fitting problem in a high-
dimensional space, learning is equivalent to finding a surface in a multidimensional space 
that best fits the training data. Generalization is then equivalent to using this multi­
dimensional surface to interpolate the test data. Such a viewpoint is indeed the moti­
vation behind the method of radial basis functions (RBFs). Broomhead and Lowe [67] 
first explored the use of FlBFs in neural networks. Moody and Darken [68], Renals and 
Rohwer [69], and Poggio and Girosi [70] among others made major contributions to the 
theor>', design, and application of RBF networks. 
The basic architecture of a RBF network is shown in Figure 4.6. It includes three 
entirely different layers. The first layer is an input layer for which each node corresponds 
to an attribute of an input pattern. The second layer is a hidden layer that is used to 
cover the whole input space with each node covering a different region. The third layer 
is an output layer responding to the input patterns. The transformation from the input 
layer to the hidden layer is nonlinear, whereas the transformation from the hidden layer 
to the output layer is linear. As illustrated in Figure 4.7, an activation function for a 
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«P(.) 
0  
y 
Figure 4.6 A radial basis function network 
iiidden layer node is a locally radially symmetric function (typically Gaussian function), 
where the output decays to zero as the distance (usually Euclidean distance) between 
the input vector and its center increases, see Figure 4.7. 
There are two important parameters, center and width, associated with an activation 
function. center is a vector with the same dimension as the input pattern, which 
represents a cluster center of the input space. .A. width is used to control the spread 
of the RBF so that its output decays more slowly or more rapidly as the distance 
between the input vector zmd the center increases. Each RBF responds to a small 
convex region of the feature space. .A. large number of these functions cover the entire 
Output 
0 
Distance to centcr ^ 
Figure 4.7 A radial basis function in one-dimensional space 
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feature space so that the output layer neurons can join them with different weights to 
accomplish the function approximation or classification. Figure 4.8 shows a portion of 
two-dimensional feature space covered by RBFs. 
Without loss of generality, consider a RBF network with only one output. The output 
of such a network can be expressed as 
X, 
Figure 4.8 A portion of two-dimensional feature space covered by RBFs 
/(x) = i^u.-iV^.(||x-c,|i) (4.1) 
1=1 
where x is an input pattern. Cj is the center for hidden node i. ivi is the weight between 
hidden node i and the output node, and wq is a bias weight. M is the number of hidden 
nodes, is the acti\-ation function for the hidden layer. The norm ||-|| can be Euclidian 
or Mahalanobis distance [75. p. 87]. A RBF approximation using Gaussian functions is 
considered below. 
WTien y(-) is a Gaussian function, (4.1) can be seen as approximating a probability 
density by a mixture of Gaussian functions. The Gaussian function can be expressed as 
ip{u) =6 2^ 
The output can then be expressed as 
(4.2) 
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M 
/(x) = Wie (4.3) 
:=1 
RBF networks provide an attractive approach for function appro.\imation because of 
their flexible structure, fast training, powerful generalization capability, and conceptual 
elegance. Park and Sandberg [71] have shown that RBF networks with Gaussian basis 
functions are universal function approximators. Girosi and Poggio [72] have shown 
pointwise convergence property of a class of RBF networks. 
There are different training strategies for RBF networks [77]. Since the linear weights 
associated with the output node tend to evolve more slowly than the nonlinear activation 
functions of the hidden nodes, it is reasonable to train the network layer by layer to get 
fast training speed. The training strategies can be divided into the following three classes 
depending on how the centers of the RBFs are specified. 
Fixed centers selected randomly 
The simplest and fastest approach is to randomly select centers from the training 
data set and keep them constant throughout the training. This is reasonable provided 
that the training data are well representative of the problem. The widths for all RBFs 
are also fixed and are the same. This width can be taken as the standard de%-iation of 
the Gaussian function, expressed as 
d 
G — (4.4) 
sfWl  ^ ' 
where d is the maximum distance between the selected centers. Such a choice for the 
standard deviation a is to ensure that RBFs are neither too peaked to cover the whole 
input space nor too flat to distinguish between dissimilar input patterns. 
Then, the only parameters that need to be trained are the weights between the hidden 
and output layer, which can be computed directly by solving linear equations. Usually 
the number of training patterns is much larger than the number of selected centers. 
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so the resulting linear equations are overdetermined. A straightforward procedure for 
solving such equations is to use the pseudoinverse method [67] to obtain a solution with 
the minimum least square error. 
The linear weights can also be solved by iteration using a gradient-descent technique. 
This approach is much faster than the BP algorithm for MLPs because it adjusts only 
the weights between the hidden and output layer whereas MLPs adjust weights between 
all layers. The generalization capability and accuracy level depends on the number of 
centers and the representativeness of the training data set to the problem that is being 
studied. 
Unsupervised selection of centers 
In principle, any unsupervised or clustering algorithm can be used to specify the 
centers. For example, one may use k-means clustering algorithm [68]. hierarchical cluster 
analysis, or self-organizing map. After determining the centers, one may obtain the linear 
weights either by directly solving the linear equations or by iteration. 
Supervised selection of centers 
This is the most flexible but most time-consuming training approach among the three 
strategies. The centers, widths, and linear weights are all adjusted through a supervised 
training process. A natural candidate for such a process is an error correction iteration 
algorithm using gradient-descent technique. 
The squared error for the output can be written as 
- k=i 
The update equations for the linear weights, centers, and widths are given as fol­
lows [77, Chapter 7] 
E (4.5) 
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Wi{t + 1) = w,{t) + r/i - yk)e (4.6) 
c,_,(f+l) = c^Jit) + ^2^[ak-yk)u:^[l)e -• • {xkj - c^J{t)) (4.7) 
a^{t + 1) = af{t) + r/3 - yk)u;,:^k • (4.8) 
For the thermal overload problem. GAXX was run with RBFXs using the learning 
algorithm of fixed centers, for 5 different cardinality levels, from 5 to 10. with parameters 
1-4 forced (preselected) into the solution, meaning that all solutions provided by G.A.XX 
will have GenA, AreaLoad, GenB, and GenC. in addition to some other parameters. 
The results of GAXX runs are given in Table 4.5 [82]. The level 8 cardinality is 
chosen because it represents the best tradeoff between cardinality and accuracy. 
The results generally agree with engineering judgment. For example. Flow5 and 
V'oltl are chosen most often; FIow5 represents the flow on the overloaded circuit and 
Voltl is a bus voltage close to the outaged circuit. The results show that GAXX with 
RBFXs using the learning algorithm of fixed centers runs faster than with MLPs using 
the BP learning algorithm. For example, at cardinality level of 8, it took almost 10 times 
faster for the former than the latter (8903 seconds \vith RBFXs versus 88886 seconds 
with MLPs). 
For evaluation of the feature selection effect, the test results with 8 selected attributes 
and with all 32 attributes are shown in Figure 4.9. It can be seen that the test error 
is much smaller using the selected attributes. Furthermore, training with fewer selected 
attributes takes less time than with ail 32 attributes although the CPU time is increasing 
w-ith the nimiber of centers in both cases, as shown in Figure 4.10. It is noted that the 
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Table 4.5 Feature selection results for the thermal overload with cardinality 
levels 5-10 (using RBFXs) 
Parameter 
Name 
Cardinality Level 
o 6 7 8 9 10 
GenA 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Load 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GenB 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GenC 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Flowl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow5 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Flow6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow? 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flows 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIow9 0 0 1 0 1 0 
FlowlO 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flow 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flowl2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Flow 13 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Voltl 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Volt2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Volts 0 0 0 1 0 0 
\blt4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
\blt6 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Volt? 0 0 0 0 1 0 
VoItS 0 0 0 0 0 1 
\blt9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Voltll 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Volt 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Voltl4 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Flowl4 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Average Error .0222 .0161 .0095 .0087 .0083 .0061 
^ 0  
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Figure 4.9 Test errors versus number of centers (random selection of cen­
ters) 
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Figure 4.10 CPU time versus number of centers (random selection of cen­
ters) 
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accuracy level is improved with the increase of the number of centers, but this is 
achieved at the price of solution speed decrease. Therefore, the user must make a 
tradeoff between accuracy and speed by choosing the number of centers. Like choosing 
the hidden nember of hidden nodes for MLPs, unfortunately, there is no theoretical 
guidance for choosing the number of centers for RBFXs. 
4.6.3.2 Genetic algorithm with k-nearest neighbor method 
To further improve the solution speed, the k-nearest neighbor method instead of 
neural networks is used to evaluate feature sets. Table 4.6 shows the feature selection 
results using RBFXs and KXXs for the thermal overload problem. From the table, 
we can see that the solution speed with KXXs is much faster. However, the error will 
be much larger if we use KXXs to predict the postcontingency performance measure 
based on the selected features. Xote that MLPs are still to be used in postcontingency 
performance measure prediction. 
Table 4.6 Comparison of feature selection results using RBFXs 
and KXXs for the thermal overload problem 
Radial basis function networks k-nearest neighbors 
Features selected 1.2.3.4.9.17.18.32 1.2.3.4.9.17.19.32 
Running time 8903 4709 
.Average error 0.0012 0.0270 
4.7 Comparisons of different feature selection methods 
The feature selection methods discussed above include the cluster analysis, the Ko-
honen self-organizing map, cind the genetic algorithm based methods. The genetic algo­
rithm based methods include those with MLPs, RBFXs, and KXXs. Two comparisons 
will be made as follows. 
I i 
4.7.1 Solution speed 
According to the decreasing order of solution speed, the first is the cluster analysis 
followed by the Kohonen self-organizing map. and the genetic algorithm based methods 
are the last. Of the \^riations of the genetic algorithm based methods, the method with 
KXXs is the fastest, that with RBFNs is the second fasted, and that with MLPs is the 
slowest. Table 4.7 lists the solution time for the genetic algorithm based methods with 
MLPs. RBFNs, and KXXs with cardinality level 8 for the thermal overload problem. 
Table 4.7 Comparison of solution time (s) 
.MLPs RBFNs K.XNs 
S8886 8903 4709 
4.7.2 Prediction accuracy 
The MLPs are used to predict the postcontingency performance measure using se­
lected features because they are the most accurate. To compare the accuracy levels for 
features selected by different methods, a MLP with one hidden neuron is trained and 
tested using these features. Table 4.8 lists the selected features and the average errors 
for the genetic algorithm based methods with MLPs, RBFXs. and KXXs with cardinal­
ity level 8 for the thermal overload problem. From this table, we can find the following 
facts. First, the accuracy levels for cluster analysis and Kohonen self-organizing map 
\-ary depending on what features are selected from the clusters or nodes. Second, the 
accuracy level for GAXX with MLPs is highest. This is reasonable because the features 
selected by GANX with MLPs were used to train a MLP itself. The accuracy level for 
GAXX with RBFXs is lower than that for GAXX with MLPs but higher than that for 
GAXX with KXXs. For more thorough comparison, it is better to consider the variances 
as well. 
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Table 4.8 Comparison of prediction accuracy 
Method Features Selected .\verage Error 
G.\XN--MLP 1.2.3,4.17.21,29.32 0.0029 
G.A..\N-RBFN 1,2,3.4,9.17,18.32 0.0034 
GANN-KNN 1.2.3,4.9,17,19.32 0.0036 
Cluster .Analysis 1.2.3.4.5.9.10.18 0.0051 
1,2.3,4.11.12.17.18 0.0045 
1.2.3,4.9,12.18.32 0.0035 
1.2.3.4,9,12,15.18 0.0032 
1.2.3.4,10,13.16,17 0.0045 
Kohonen .Map 1.2.3.4.5.9.10.18 0.0051 
1.2.3.4.5.6.9,18 0.0041 
1.2.3.4.7.17.18.32 0.0032 
1.2.3.4.7,17.20.32 0.0037 
1.2.3.4.12.17.18.32 0.0032 
4.8 Summary 
Three classes of feature selection methods have been discussed: cluster analysis. 
Kohonen self-organizing map, and genetic algorithm based methods. Cluster analysis 
and Kohonen self-organizing map divide the features into various clusters according to 
their similarities. They are fast. Then, for feature selection, only one feature needs to 
be picked up from each cluster to represent this cluster. Therefore, there are different 
feature selection results depending on which feature is selected from each cluster. Some 
results may give higher accuracy, some results may give lower accuracy. There is no 
guarantee that a good accuracy is achieved. 
In consideration of this fact, genetic algorithm based methods are preferred. Among 
GAXX with MLPs, GAXX with RBFXs, and GAXX with KXXs. GAXX with KXXs has 
fastest solution speed but lowest accuracy, and GAXX with MLPs highest accuracy but 
slowest solution speed, which should be used? By making a trade-off between solution 
speed and accuracy, GAXX with RBFXs is recommended because it is much faster than 
GAXX with MLPs without much loss of accuracy. 
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5 TRAINING AND USING NEURAL NETWORKS FOR 
BOUNDARY APPROXIMATION 
5.1 Introduction 
After generating data and selecting features, the next step is to train neural networks 
using the data and features to predict postcontingency performance given precontingency 
information, for a single contingency. Issues in training and using neural networks are 
discussed in this chapter. Overfitting. underfitting, and accuracy improvement near the 
boundar\- during training are addressed first to achieve the expected accuracy. Then, 
confidence interval calculation formulas for neural network outputs are derived and im­
plemented for MLPs. Finally, sensitivities of neural network outputs with respect to 
inputs are derived and implemented for MLPs. 
5.2 Training neural networks 
5.2.1 Overfitting and underfitting 
Overfitting and underfitting are ver\* important problems for neural network training. 
If the number of degrees of freedom of the neural network is too high (low) with respect 
to the training set, the neural network is verv- likely overfitted (underfitted). If the neural 
network is underfitted, it is difficult to reach an acceptable convergent training error. If 
the neural network is overfitted, the training error may be low but the test error can be 
much higher. A neural network is said to memorize rather than learn the training data 
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if it responds to a sample in the training data set in the same manner as it was trained, 
but it responds to other samples with ver\' poor results. In the case of overfitting. a 
neural network just memorizes the training data, hence the generalization capability is 
ver\- poor. To alleviate this problem, the following approaches may be used: 
Underfitting detection by a trial and error approach 
After the training process has converged, if the training error is higher than the 
\'alue one would e.xpect, it means that an underfitting occurs. Therefore, the network 
complexity, i.e.. the number of degrees of freedom of the neural network, should be 
increased and a new network trained. In the case of MLPs with one hidden layer, 
the number of hidden neurons should be increased. If an underfitting still occurs after 
training the new network, another trial is needed with respecc to a more complex network 
structure. 
Overfitting detection by monitoring and comparing training error and test error 
Initially, both training error and test error decrecise with training iterations, then 
flatten out until some point where the training error still decreases but the test error 
begins to increcise. This point is where overfitting occurs. Figure 5.1 illustrates this 
situation. However, it is not always apparent to see this point because some oscillations 
of test error may occur. 
5.2.2 Exploration of improvement on accuracy near the boimdary 
Because the ultimate goal of this research is to produce boundaries, which are con­
tours of constant sv'stem performance, the accuracy of the function approximation 
R = /(X) 
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Number of iterations 
Figure 5.1 Variation of training and test errors with the number of itera­
tions. 
at the boundar\- R = Rq is a major concern. However, because no other x-alues of R are 
ultimately revealed to the operator, it is much less concerned with the accuracy of 
at points not on the boundar\\ Therefore, the accuracy off the boundar>" can be sacrificed 
if the accuracy on the boundarv- can be simultaneously improved. One method has been 
identified to do this. This method is called weighted output errors. 
During training, let the output error near the boundary* have larger weight than that 
far away from the boundary in the total error of all the outputs. The following function 
is used to obtain a weight w for the desired output d where x > 1 (the smaller x. the 
larger the weights for points close to the boundarj-) and d = 0 occurs for a point on the 
boundary-. Figure 5.2 shows a plot of fxmction (5.1) for x = 8. It Ccin be seen that the 
farther the desired output is from the boundary-, the smaller the weight is. Figure 5.3 
shows the distribution of 411 test samples. Figure 5.4 shows the test error distribution for 
test samples using the weighted errors training and that using regular training. However, 
R = /(X) 
w = 1 — (5.1) 
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the result with weighted errors is not better than that without weighted errors for points 
close to the boundar\- as it was expected. The reason may be that the weight update 
approach is still the gradient descent technique, which is used for updating weights. To 
find the exact explanation, it requires further investigation, which is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
0,91 
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Figure 5.2 Plot of function w = I — d^. 
5.3 Confidence intervals for neural network outputs 
WTien a trciined neural network is used for prediction, it is desirable to e\"aluate the 
reliability of the performance. One way to do this is to give a confidence measure for 
the neural network output. 
From the view of statistics, function approximation by neural networks can be 
thought of as a nonparametric nonlinear regression problem. Therefore, confidence in­
terval estimation methods for nonparametric nonlinear regression can also be used for 
evaluating confidence intervals for neural network outputs. In what follows, the con-
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Figure 5.4 Test error distributions. 
84 
fidence interval expressions for MLPs will be derived based on a general formula for 
nonparametric nonlinear regression. 
Consider a general nonlinear regression model [76] with p parameters to be estimated 
and n observations 
Ui = /(x,,0)+ i = (5.2) 
where ij is the actual output, x is the input vector. 0 is a vector of the parameters to be 
estimated, and cj is the error associated with the function /. We assume that 5,'s are 
normal and independent with zero mean and common variance a-. Let 9 be the least 
squares estimator of 6, then 
5(«) = Zb-Zfe-S)!' (5.3) 
t = l  
is minimized. The nonlinear function in (5.2) can be expanded in a Taylor series around 
the estimated vector 9 retaining only the first order terms. Thus 
/(x.,0) % f { - x . i , d )+z l {9 -9 ) .  i= l r - - , n  (5.4) 
where 
= 
d f { ^ , 9 )  d f { x , , 9 )  d f { x i . 9 )  
d9i ' 892 ' ' d9p 
(5.5) 
8=a 
Equation (5.4) is a linear approximation of the nonlineiir fimction in (5.2) in the neigh­
borhood of 9. and it can be written as 
y i - f { x i , 9 )  =  ^ {9 -9 )+£ i ,  i  =  (5.6) 
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Because of the statistical independence between Q and c ^'s. given x q , the variance of 
the output j/o can be expressed as 
var(yo - yo) = i-ar(co) + v-ar(g^(^ - ^)) (5.7) 
For an error Sq with a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of 
<7-(.V(0. cr-I„)), the distribution o i  6  — 6  can be approximated to have 
.Vp(0, <7-[G^G]~^), where G is the Jacobian matrix defined as 
the distribution 
G = 
a/(xi ,6) 
d0i 
d f {x2 .0 )  
dSi 
9 f i x i .B )  
ee-z 
d f {x -2 .B )  
dOz 
d f i x i .B )  
ddp  
Of (x2 .8 )  
aOp (5.8) 
Thus, we can obtain 
d f {x„ .0 )  
aoi 
d f iXn .B)  
002 
Of (Xn .9 )  
dOp  6=6 
var[y 0 — i/o] = = <T- + a-g^(g^g) ^go (5.9) 
cr- can be approximated by 
s- = '^ bt - /(Xi. 9)]-
: = i  " - P  
As a result, the standard error of a predicted value f{xo,6) is given by 
The Student i-distribution is 
yo  -  Vo f 
*'71—P 
^var[?/o - j/o] 
Vq - yo 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
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The approximate 100(1—a)9c confidence interval on the prediction for a new observation 
Xo is then given by 
This is a general expression of the confidence interval for any regression problem. 
The plus and minus signs in (5.14) are used to give the upper bound and lower bound of 
the confidence interval. For all of the observations for which the confidence intervals are 
computed, the envelopes can be obtained by connecting all of the lower bound points 
and all of the upper bound points, respectively. 
For the case of neural networks, weights correspond to 9 and input patterns cor­
respond to Xq. Therefore, we can easily derive the confidence interval expressions for 
different types of neural networks using (5.14). The key is the calculation of deri\-atives 
of the output with respect to weights [81]. which are used in formulation of G. 
For MLPs with one hidden layer as shown in Figure 5.5. the derivatives of output ijj 
with respect to weight Wji between the hidden and output layer can be derived as 
The derivatives of output yj with respect to weight between the input and hidden 
(5.14) 
dVj  _ ^ dv j  
dwj i  dv j  dwj t  
(5.15) 
Figure 5.5 A detailed structure of a multilayer perceptron 
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layer can be derived as 
dy j  _  dy j  dv j  d z ,  dv j  
dwik dvj dzi dt'i dwik 
= iyj(^vj)wjnp^{vi)xk (5.16) 
where Zi is the output of hidden node i .  v j  is the dot product of the outputs from the 
hidden nodes and weights between the hidden nodes and output node j. >;;(•) is the 
activation function of a node. 
When a hyperbolic tangent function 
^{x )  =  a  tanh(6x) 
gfcr _ g-6x 
e'^ + 
'2a 
— ^ ~ (5.17) 1 + e--'^ ^ ' 
is used as an activation function, its deri\^tive is 
^ ' { x )  =  ab{ l - ip ' { x ) )  (.5.18) 
where a  and 6 are constants specifying the range and the slope of the function, respec­
tively. Using this activation function for all of the nodes. (5.15) and (5.16) become 
dy j  
dwji = a6(l - y-(vj))zi (5.19) 
and 
= a 'b - ( l  -  :p-{v j ) y i v j i ( l  -  ~^^ iv i ) ) xk  (5.20) 
dwik 
respectively. 
The confidence interval calculation method has been applied to the thermal overload 
problem for a demonstration. Figure 5.6 shows the 90% confidence intervals for a portion 
of test data for the thermal overload problem. It can be seen that the desired output 
falls between the envelopes of the confidence interval with probability about 90%. 
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Figure 5.6 90% confidence interval for the test data of the thermal overload 
problem. 
To apply the confidence interval calculation method to the boundar>-. simply calculate 
the confidence interval and obtain the lower and upper bounds for each boundarv* point, 
then connect the lower bound points and the upper bound points, respectively. 
5.4 Sensitivity ansdysis of the neural network output with re­
spect to input parameters 
Analyzing the sensitivity of the neural network output with respect to input parame­
ters will help operators understand the relative importance of these parameters in terms 
of their contributions to av^lable security margin. 
For MLPs with one hidden layer of m nodes (see Figure 5.5), the sensitivity of output 
j with respect to input k can be derived as follows 
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= (5.21) 
1=1 
When a hyperbolic tangent function (5.17) is used for activation functions for all of 
the nodes. (5.21) becomes 
z;)w,k (5.22) 
OXk  
Figure 5.7 shows the sensitivity of the MLP output with respect to the S input 
parameters for the thermal overload problem. Figure 5.8 shows the sensitivity of the 
MLP output with respect to the 11 input parameters for the voltage instability problem. 
These sensitivity plots are with respect to a specific operating condition. For the thermal 
overload problem, the most sensitive parameter is input parameter 5. which is Flowl.3. 
Because the corresponding sensitivity is positive, increeising Flowl3 will make the system 
more insecure. For the voltage instability problem, the most sensitive parameters are 
input parameters 7 and 8, which are the two bus voltage magnitudes, \blt7 and \bltl4. 
Because the corresponding sensitivities are negative, an operating condition change that 
3 1  1  1  I  !  !  1  ! 1 ! 
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Figure 5.7 Sensitivity of the MLP output with respect to the 8 input pa­
rameters for the thermal overload problem. 
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Figure 5.8 Sensitivity of the MLP output with respect to the 11 input pa­
rameters for the voltage instability problem. 
results in an increase in the two voltage magnitudes can lead the system to more secure 
conditions. Therefore, this fact can be a guideline for the operator to adjust the most 
influential parameters to make the system more secure. 
5.5 Summsiry 
In this chapter, two issues related to neural network training have been discussed, 
then the confidence inter\-al calculation has been derived and illustrated, finally the 
sensitivities of the neural network output with respect to the inputs has been derived 
£md anzdyzed. 
One issue in neural network training is to make sure that neither overtraining nor 
undertraining occurs. Overtraining can be detected by monitoring and comparing the 
training error and the test error. Undertraining can be detected by a trial and error 
approach. Another issue in neural network training especially for the boundary- visual­
ization problems is to make points closer to the boundarv- more accurate. A weighted 
- -
LJL_1 
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output error approach has been explored but is not effective. 
Confidence intervals can be a measure of the neural network output reliability. The 
calculation formula have been derived for the MLPs based on nonparametric nonlinear 
regression. .A.n example has been given to illustrate how to calculate confidence interval 
conculation for the thermal overload problem. 
Sensitivities of the neural network output with respect to the inputs can provide a 
control guideline for the operator to effectively adjust the system to more secure con­
ditions. The sensitivity calculation has been derived and demonstrated for the thermal 
overload and voltage instability problems. 
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6 PRESENTATION TECHNIQUES 
6.1 Introduction 
The ultimate goal of this research is to enable highly accurate nomogram presentation 
to the operator. This presentation should be fast and automatic so that it can interface 
with other software and communication equipment in the control center that provides 
\-alues of the critical parameters corresponding to the current operating conditions. 
This chapter addresses how to present the boundar\- to the operator, i.e.. boundar>" 
visualization. First, the problem of boundary' visualization is formulated in Section 6.2. 
The individual boundar>* visualization approach is described in Section 6.3. .\n algo­
rithm to visualize composite boundaries is developed in Section 6.4. An approach to 
available transfer capability calculation is proposed in Section 6.5. Obtaining the update 
functions is described in Section 6.6. 
6.2 Problem formulation 
After the neural network is trained, the mapping between the critical parameters 
and the postcontingency performance measure is formed. This mapping function is used 
to draw a security boundarv'. i.e., all points on the boundarv* must satisfy- this function. 
The other constraint is that all points on the boundary must satisfy' the power flow 
equations. Therfore, in drawing a security boundary, the following constraints must be 
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satisfied simultaneously 
/(x) - = 0 (6.1) 
h(u) = 0 (6.2) 
where (6.1) represents the mapping function. (6.2) represents the power flow equations. 
X is the critical parameter vector, and u is the input parameter vector to the power flow 
program. If x does not include any dependent parameters, then x C u. 
For convenience, the two critical parameters that characterize the space for which 
the boundarv' is drawn are referred to as the presented critical parameters and others 
are called covered critical parameters. In drawing a boundary- in the space of the two 
presented parameters (independent critical parameters). (6.1) will be used to search the 
values of one presented critical parameter on the boundary* points for given values of 
the other presented critical parameter. However, the problem is how to ensure that 
the boundar\- points satisfy the power flow equations. In fact, when one solves (6.1) 
in drawing the boundarv', one will always obtain the boundar\- points satisfying (6.2) 
if each critical parameter vector x that is provided to the mapping function during 
the solution procedure satisfies the power flow equations. This is because the mapping 
function is obtained by training neural networks using data from simulations that satisfy 
the power flow equations. Thus, we need to make sure that the critical parameter vector 
proWded to the mapping function satisfies the power flow equations whenever we solve 
(6.1). There are two different solutions to this problem, depending on whether any of 
the critical parameters are dependent. 
If there are no dependent critical parameters, i.e., all critical parameters are inde­
pendent critical parameters that would be part of input parjmieters to the power flow 
program, then the boundaiy- is drawn in the space of the presented parameters with 
all covered parameters fixed. In this case, the power flow equations are automatically 
satisfied because variations of the two presented critical parameters do not influence the 
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covered parameters. If a covered parameter \-aIue changes, the boundary' needs to be 
redrawn to account for this change. 
If one or more critical parameters are dependent, their \-alues can not be fixed in 
drawing the boundary. This is because their values are dependent on the independent 
critical param.eters. Variations of the two presented critical parameters in drawing the 
boundar>- will influence the dependent parameters according to the power flow equation 
constraints. Therefore, this influence must be considered in order to satisfy the power 
flow equations. This can be done by introducing a full power flow solution into the visu­
alization software: however, the increase in the computational cost would outweigh the 
improvement in accuracy. Instead, this dependency can be modeled using appropriate 
update functions as described in Section 6.6. 
The following is the description of the algorithm developed to draw the boundarv*. 
6.3 Individual boundary visualization 
6.3.1 General description 
After the neural network is trained, the obtained mapping function (6.1) is used to 
visualize the boundary-. Let x = [z^.y^p, z = y = [j/u • • • • J/iPr then 
the mapping function can identify- a two-dimensional boundary- with axes of zi and 
^'2 w here ^ *-1 ^ •'i.max? ^ "-2 ^ and ''' * constant. 
The algorithm starts from the current operating point = (z^°'.y^°'). If dependent 
parameters are used in characterizing the boundary, then variations in Ci and Zo that 
are made when drawing the boundarv* must be used to update y. It is assumed that 
simple, approximate expressions may be developed to perform this update (see Section 
6.6). These expressions are denoted as gj,(y^°^ Azo) r where Azi is the change in Zi 
from the \-alue 2,-°^ from which the algorithm was initialized, i.e. 
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so that 
y'" = g,(y<°i.A-n.Aj,) (6.3) 
Substitution of equation (6.3) into equation (6.1) allows the neural network mapping 
function to be expressed as a function of z only, i.e., 
A search algorithm has been developed to obtain the boundar>- from the above equa­
tion. The basic procedure is to repeatedly solve for ;•> as the given value of Ci increases 
from the minimum to the maximum. 
6.3.2 Application to the thermal overload problem 
6.3.2.1 Boundary plotting 
Eight initial points, labeled as 1:0. 2:0, etc. in Table 6.1, were used to initialize the 
boundar\- plots. These initial points represent eight different operating conditions and 
characterize the power system at, for example, different times of the day. A power flow-
case was constructed for each of these operating conditions, and from each of these cases, 
the \'alues for the 4 dependent parameters were obtained. These \-alues. together with 
the %^ues of the 4 independent parameters, constitute the initial conditions required to 
draw the boundarj* corresponding to the thermal overload problem. These boundaries 
were drawn using the visualization software and are illustrated in Figures 6.1 - 6.4. 
One might note that Figure 6.3 indicates that the operating conditions corresponding to 
points 5 and 6 are identical in the presented parameters; however they are different in 
terms of the covered parameters as indicated in Table 6.1. The fact that the boundaries 
for the two operating conditions are slightly different reflects the ability of the procedure 
to respond to changes in covered critical parameters. 
(6.4) 
Tahhi G.l Results of tlKuinal overload boundary accuracy asscssujcnt 
I'oiiit Siibarua C!L'ii(!ratiuii A CifiHTatinii 1) C!i>iii!rali()ii C! Qiiiax'l Qmax5 Maliii Vincciil n  
load Rtin read gfii ri-acl rt-acl ri'ai:l gt'ii rt'iK I 
luvul ri)\)Uy levi'l rphlty Icvt'l cphlly tpblly U'vi^l cpblly 
1:0 2130 800 585 0 0 155 78 86.0 0 51.3 -1500 .05222 
IH 2100 512 585 0 0 155 78 8().() 0 51.3 -1500 -.01557 
ll> 2l()0 978 585 0 0 155 78 HO.(i 0 51.3 -1500 .01 OHO 
2:0 2510 HOO 585 0 175.3 155 78 HO.G 0 51.3 -1500 .11872 
•2a 2100 193 585 0 175.3 155 78 HO.O 0 51.3 -1500 -.01230 
21) 2100 9fi0 585 0 175.3 155 78 80.0 0 51.3 -1500 .00718 
:};0 2B15 800 585 200 175.3 155 78 80.0 0 51.3 ) -1500 .11758 
:<» 2100 KM 585 200 175.3 155 78 80.0 0 51.3 ) -1500 -.00815 
Ml) 2r)Hf) H53 585 200 175.3 155 78 8U.0 0 51.3 -1500 .00527 
•1;0 2900 800 585 •100 175.3 155 78 HO.O 0 51.3 -1500 -.01255 
lii 2550 109 5H5 100 175.3 155 78 HO.O 0 51.3 -1500 -.01115 
11) 2H20 ()3() 585 100 175.3 155 7H 80.0 0 51.3 -1500 -.00903 
5:0 2i:»o 800 585 0 0 155 7H 80.0 0 51.3 -1100 .09707 
Aa 2IU0 «27 585 0 0 155 78 80.0 0 51.3 -1100 -.00817 
5t) 2.1f)0 IU'.I3 585 0 U 155 78 H().(i 0 51.3 -1100 .02832 
0:0 2130 HOO 390 0 0 155 78 0 0 0 -1100 .13992 
(ia 21 <10 (>09 390 0 0 155 78 0 0 0 •1100 -.00352 
())> 2370 979 390 0 0 155 78 0 0 0 -1100 .01301 
7:0 2130 800 585 0 0 0 0 80.0 0 51.3 -1500 .21988 
7a 2100 890 585 0 0 0 0 80.0 0 51.3 -1500 .00101 
71) 2325 1121 585 0 0 0 0 HO.O 0 51,3 -1500 .01191 
H:0 2!)00 HOO 585 •100 175.3 0 0 HO.O 0 51.3 -1500 .11173 
Hit 2ino 38H 585 100 175.3 0 0 HO.O 0 51.3 -1500 -.02135 
HI) 2(1H5 777 5H5 100 175.3 0 0 HO.O 0 51.3 -1500 -.01101 
CO O) 
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Figure 6.1 Thermal overload boundar\' for initial points 1:0 and 2:0 
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Figure 6.2 Thermal overload boundary for initial points 3:0 and 4:0 
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Figure 6.3 Thermal overload boundar>' for initial points 5:0 and 6:0 
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Figure 6.4 Thermal overload boundarv' for initial points 7:0 and 8:0 
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6.3.2.2 Accuracy assessment 
For each boimdar\'. two boundary- points, labeled as la, lb, etc. in Table 6.1. were 
identified to test for accuracy. The operating conditions corresponding to these points 
are designated using the same notation as in Table 6.1. For each boundary- point, it 
should be the case that the current flow on the overloaded circuit is /o=600 A. The last 
column of Table 6.1 provides the performance mejisure R = .A.11 points on the 
boundar\- (e.g., la.lb. and 2a.2b. etc.) should have /? = 0 if the boundar\- is correct. 
Therefore, nonzero R for boundary- points provide a measure of the difference between 
the actual flow, as determined by power flow simulation, and the flow predicted by the 
boundary-, normalized by the threshold voltage of 600 A. This is an appropriate indicator 
of error, given as a percentage of the threshold flow. 
The table indicates that maodmum error on the boundary* is 0.04361 (4.4%), which 
occurs for case 6. The errors for boundaries are expected since these boundaries in­
corporate two approximations: one associated with the update function and the other 
associated with the neural network prediction function. 
6.3.3 Application to the voltage instability problem 
6.3.3.1 Boimdary plotting 
ASAS was used to randomly generate eight cases for use in boundary- accuracy as­
sessment. These cases, labeled 9:0-16:0, are summarized in Table 6.2. The boundaries 
were drawn using the v-isualization softwcire and are illustrated in Figures 6.5-6.8. 
Table G.2 Test results for AS AS generated operating conditions 
roinl Ciini Subnron Clun Cit'll I'lowO l''olwl3 VoU7 Voun Qiiiiixl QMiax3 Qinax'l It ]{ I'^rror 
A I.Oiul li r: MW MW kV kV MVAr MVAr MVAr (Neural) (Actual) MVAr 
MW MW MW MW MVAr MVAr 
OiO 212.1 2'IKO 155 2fi0.8 210.0 132.0 .0073 1.0005 585 I I I  80.0 397 330 07 
!)<> 212.1 2H2H 155 200.8 291.8 103.0 .9382 .9580 585 111 80.0 200 129 71 
Oa-i: 212.1 282H 155 2()U.8 295.0 105.5 .9310 .9115 585 Ml 80.0 178 129 •19 
Ul) •III!) 281!) 155 200.8 387.3 131.3 .951 1 .9727 585 111 80.0 200 109 31 
!)li-r •JU!) 281!) 155 200.8 .181.1 1.38.1 .9273 .9507 585 111 80.0 188 109 19 
10:0 701.1 .1000 87.8 205.0 107.8 188.9 .9011 .9028 585 111 80.0 07 II 20 
10.1 :JO:» 280:i 87.8 205.0 321.3 179.9 .9.591 .9802 585 111 80.0 200 I I I  50 
lOiv-f :u>:» •280;j 87.8 205.0 323.7 185.8 .9320 .9155 585 111 80.0 159 111 15 
lOb 707.2 a8o;< 87.8 205.0 377.3 101.7 .9139 .9701 585 I'll 80.0 200 188 12 
lOb-c 727.2 2803 87.8 205.0 379.0 108.0 .9333 .9557 585 111 80.0 179 188 -9 
11:0 •105.1 25G1 81.9 150.3 331.0 151.3 .9175 .9503 585 73 0 183 188 -5 
l l »  •121.2 25:J!) 81.9 150.3 329.7 151.1 .9510 .9503 585 73 0 200 200 0 
lla-c •121.2 25;«t 8l.'J I5t>.3 329.7 151. .9500 .9,503 585 73 0 200 205 -5 
l i b  UO!) 2520 81.9 1.50.3 392.8 129.3 .9072 .950.3 585 73 0 2U0 222 -22 
II be !)0!) 2520 81.9 150.3 389.9 132.0 .9390 .9503 585 73 0 181 222 -38 
12:0 089.2 21:17 111 .n 221.5 312.8 131.3 .9193 .9012 390 110 •13,3 212 227 15 
I2» 212.1 2511 l l l . f i  221.5 295.5 1.55.0 .9(i30 .9.599 .390 110 13.3 200 171 29 
I2a-i: 212.1 2511 IU.(> 221.5 291.9 l5K.(i .9123 .9110 390 110 13.3 170 171 5 
r2b 7H7.H 2500 l l l . O  221.5 301.5 130.5 .9385 .9517 390 110 •13,3 200 100 •10 
l-Jbr 787.H 250(1 II 1.0 221.5 301.2 1.30.5 .9.380 .9519 3!)0 110 13,3 200 100 •10 
o 
o 
Table 6.2 (continued) 
i;i:0 •105.1 2600 81.0 150.3 .MO.fi 100.2 .!):i50 .92.18 .585 7;) 0 279 271 8 
lliit :»O:J 21!) 1 81.U 150.:< ;»oi.:» 155.5 .9019 .90:i3 585 7;i 0 200 208 -8 
lltil-C ;«):} 21U1 81.0 l50.;j :)12.8 157.1 .9101 .9:199 585 7.1 U 211 208 :J 
l.'ill 00!) 2187 81.!) I50.:i :J5!).0 110.2 .9110 .9509 585 7;i 0 200 191 0 
l.'ibc !)()!) 2187 81.U 150.:J ;i5!).5 112.2 .9:»9!) ,9190 585 7:i 0 22:» 191 29 
M:0 (i8!).l 2100 111.0 221.5 2!)7.7 100.2 .9717 1.0005 .190 110 •13.;| -10 20 .10 
Mil :JO:» 2527 111.0 221.5 .•)OI.:J 1.55.5 .9019 ,9(i:i:» :»90 110 •i:i.;i 200 215 -15 
llii-i: :H):i 2527 Ul.O 22-1.5 :U2.B 1.57.1 .9101 .9;J99 :«)0 no 212 215 -A  
Ml> 2510 111.0 221.5 ;i5!).0 110.2 .9110 ,9.509 .190 no •i:».:i 200 2.11 -.11 
Mlic 727.2 2510 111.0 221.5 .159.5 112.2 .9:199 ,9190 ;i!)o no i:».:i 207 2:11 -27 
15;0 •117.0 2325 85.8 217.2 ;u)7.i 1.18.0 .9017 ,9815 ;i90 108 •i:».:i 290 299 -9 
15a ;jo:i 21(il 85.8 217.2 ;tii.2 1.55.1 .9.528 ,90:i0 .190 108 •i:».:i 200 170 -21 
Mo:» 2101 85.8 217.2 :ii2.i 1.55.7 .9197 ,958:» ;i90 108 i:i.:i 207 170 -.11 
I5li 727.2 2172 85.8 217.2 .171.2 i:»9.3 .9198 ,9009 :)90 108 200 189 11 
727.2 2172 85.8 217.2 ;i08.9 i;i9.8 .9.528 ,9028 :<90 108 i:i.:i 198 189 9 
10:0 71!».M 2G01 •i:».8 210.0 •100.5 102.3 .9309 ,9:«8 5B5 MR y.VA 202 251 11 
lOik :JO:J 2571 •I:J.8 210.0 ;<ii.o 101.1 .9029 ,9009 585 1 18 •i:i,:i 200 201 -1 
Ifiil-f ;jo:i 2571 •I:J.8 210.0 ;ui.i 108.;l .9i:io .9175 585 M8 •i:i..i 210 201 0 
)('))> 91W 25(>H 210.1) •107.7 ii;i,2 .9100 .9015 585 118 i:i.;i 200 I8:i 17 
ll)l> r !)UU 2508 •i:i.8 210.0 112.1 1 11.0 .9:M7 .9515 585 118 i:i.:i 2I:J I8:i :«) 
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Figure 6.5 Voltage instability boundary for initial points 9:0 and 10:0 
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Figure 6.6 Voltage instability boundar}' for initial points 11:0 and 12:0 
6.3.3.2 Accuracy assessment 
For each boundary*, two points were identified to test for accuracy. These points are 
labeled on Table 6.2 as 9a,9b, and 10a,10b, etc. The operating conditions corresponding 
to these points are designated using the same notation as in Table 6.2, where, for these 
entries in the table (9a,9b, and 10a,10b, etc.), the \-alues of the dependent parmaters were 
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Figure 6.7 Voltage instability boundar>- for initial points 13:0 and 14:0 
SMftarM to«d A kIW (rt) Su0wMie«0<tUW{rt} 
Figure 6.8 Voltage instability boundarj' for initial points 15:0 and 16:0 
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computed from the initial point and the update functions via the visualization program. 
.A.Iso shown in Table 6.2, for each boundarv- point, is an additional point labeled with 
a "-C." e.g., 9a-c,9b-c and lOa-c.lOb-c, etc. Here, the values of the dependent paramaters 
were computed from a full power flow solution (as opposed to using the initial point and 
the update functions); the dependent parameter values of entries 9a.9b. and 10a. 10b. 
etc.. have therefore been "corrected." These entries allow one to identify the error in 
the dependent value calculations caused by the update functions. 
Table 6.2 also provides two R-values for each entr\- and an error value. One R-value 
is from the neural network and the other is "actual" as computed by manual solution 
of the power flow case and application of the V'CMARGIX program. The difference 
between the two R-values provides the error. .-Ml R-values have been converted from 
per-unit (as actually computed by the neural network) to M\'ARS and represent the 
additional purely reactive load at the load bus necessar\' to cause voltage instability. 
It is important to interpret the error results of Table 6.2 in a physically meaningful 
way. To this end, a sensitivity calculation was performed on several different operating 
conditions whereby the change in R for a 100 MW shift in the subarea load was com­
puted. For all operating conditions, it was found that this 100 MW shift is equivalent to 
about 50 MV.A.r of variation in R, which is a 2:1 ratio of the subarea load MW to M\'.\r 
margin. This ratio enables us to make approximate interpretation of the MVAr margin 
error in terms of subarea MW load. For example, point 9a-c in Table 6.2 indicates a 49 
MVAr margin error. This is equivalent to about 2 x 49 — 98 MW of subarea load, which 
is about 0% of the minimum t\-pical load of 2100 MW. 
The error for the initial point (e.g., 9:0, 10:0, etc.) is provided but is generally not 
indicative of the boundgirj- error since it could be far away from the boundary- where 
the neural network is most accurate. It can be seen that the maximum error for initial 
points is 67 MVAr. 
The error for the boundarv- points influenced by the update functions (e.g., 9a.9b and 
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10a,10b. etc.) indicate the total error associated with the boundary' at the evaluated 
point, where the total error is a composite of the error from the neural network and 
the error from the update functions. It can be seen that the maximum error for these 
boundan.' points is 71 MV.\r, equivalent to 142 MW of the subarea load. This error 
should be assessed in light of the following comments: 
• Error and margin: The fact that the error never exceeds the applied 200 MV'.A.R 
margin implies that all points within the indicated boundary' are in fact secure. 
• Neural Network Error: The error for the points with "corrected" dependent pa­
rameter values (e.g.. 9a-c.9b-c and lGa-c,10b-c. etc.) removes the error associated 
with the update functions and indicates only the error associated with the neural 
network. The largest neural network error is 49 MVAr. equivalent to about 98 
MW of the subarea load. 
• Error and distance from boundary: The largest error for cases with "uncorrected" 
dependent parameter \-alues (e.g.. 9a,9b, and 10a, 10b. etc.) occurs for cases 9a. 
10a, and 14a. In contrast, the error for other cases with "uncorrected" dependent 
parameter values is smaller. The reason for the larger error in cases 9, 10. and 
14 relative to the other cases is attributed to the influence of the update func­
tions. Cases 9, 10, and 14 are initialized by points that are more distant from 
the boundar\' than the points w'hich initialize the other cases, as indicated by the 
larger difference between 200 (the boundarv' value) and MVAr margin at the initial 
point itself in entries 9:0, 10:0, and 14:0 relative to entries 11:0, 12:0, 13:0, 15:0. 
and 16:0. This can also be seen by inspecting Figures 6.5-6.8. Thus, for case 9, 
10, and 14, the update functions have more influence. 
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6.3.4 Choice of presented parameters by users 
So fax. only the Subarea Load and Generation .4 are specified as presented parameters 
for boundary visualization. However, if the user is interested in boundaries using other 
critical parameters as presented parameters, these boundaries can also be easily obtained. 
Therefore, this gives more flexibility to the user on how he or she wants to view the 
system security. For example, Figures 6.9 - 6.12 show some boundaries using various 
critical parameters as the presented parameters for the thermal overload problem. 
1000 
— soo 
i 000 
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60 too 
Figure 6.9 .A. boundaiy with presented parameters Generation A and Gen­
eration B. 
6.4 Composite boundary visualization 
6.4.1 Conceptual Formulation 
The goal is to draw a single continuous boundaiy, i.e., find a closed secure region, 
given several indi\-idual security boundarv* characterizations so that each portion of the 
composite boundary corresponds to the most restrictive securit>- problem under the 
given contingency. Suppose we have M individual boundaiy characterizations that are 
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Figure 6.10 A boundary* with presented parameters Generation A and Gen­
eration C. 
Figure 6.11 A boundary with presented parameters Generation B and Sub-
area Load. 
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Figure 6.12 A boundarj' with presented parameters Generation C and Sub-
area Load. 
represented as 
/,(x,) = R,. i = (6.5) 
A neural network is trained for each of these problems and a C-code is extracted that 
characterizes the functional relationship /t(xi) = R, between critical parameter Xj and 
the performance measure Hi specific to problem i. In general, Xj ^ Xj if i ^ j. However, 
they have at least one common critical parameter, otherwise there is no reason to use 
them together to draw a composite boundarj*. For the purpose of illustration of the 
developed automatic security boundarj- characterization approach, it is assumed that 
there are two common critical parameters denoted by and co­
in order to obtain a continuous composite boundar>" (or equi\'alently. a closed secure 
region), we add following four boundaries: 
-1 ^l,min ~ 
^l,max ~ R\[+2 
^2,min ~ 
^2,max — 
108 
]S0 
250 
200 
tso 
too 
109 
These boundaries form a rectangle enclosing the region of interest in the study and 
correspond to the bounds on the presented parameters. Figure 6.13 shows a composite 
boundarv' formed by various individual boundaries. Clearly, the problem is to identify 
and draw only the portions of the boundaries enclosing the shaded region. Suppose Ri < 
0 corresponds to the secure operating conditions and R, > 0 to insecure conditions. The 
problem is then equivalent to finding the region 5 in which for ever>' point .s(ri, c-j) € 5 
/,(xi) < 0. V i = 1 M (6.6) 
B3 
B2 
zl 
Figure 6.13 A composite boundarv- formed by individual boundaries. 
6.4.2 Algorithm Description 
As shown in Figure 6.13, some points on some individual boundaries do not contribute 
to forming the composite boundary. To reduce computational cost, it is desired to avoid 
drawing these portions of the boimdaries. Therefore, starting from the minimum value 
of ^1, for each interval, as in Figure 6.14, two or more individual boundarv* functions 
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that are binding need to be identified. To do this, the functions are ranked in descending 
order of Z2, which is obtained by solving 
j = l......U (6.7) 
using a bisection search technique. Neighboring boundary' functions are paired according 
to which one follows the other in this ranking. For each pair of neighboring functions, 
an interior check is performed for security, i.e., an arbitrarily selected point (marked 
with crosses) between two neighboring boundaries is checked to see if it satisfies (6.6). 
If so, this point is inside the secure region, and the corresponding neighboring individ­
ual boundar>' functions must be the binding functions for the composite boundar>- for 
this interval. The composite boundary* is therefore identified as the pair of individual 
boundaries, and all other individual boundaries are ignored in this interval. 
If, in the next interval, there are no other individual boundarv" functions between the 
two binding functions identified in the previous interval, then these functions are also 
binding for the new interval. In this case, it is not necessary to perform the interior check 
for this interval. This is why there are no crosses for some intervals in Figure 6.14. Once 
it is no longer possible to find any secure point, i.e., there are no neighboring individual 
boundary- functions for which (6.6) is satisfied, then zi has exceeded its feasible or secure 
range, and the cdgorithm stops. At this point, a secure region is formed and a continuous 
boundary* is obtained, as in Figure 6.14. This algorithm is applicable to both linear and 
nonlinear individual boundaries as long as they form one single continuous region. Cases 
w^here individual boundaries form several disjoint regions are not considered because they 
are rare in practice. 
6.4.3 Applications to the sample system 
The critical parameters chosen by the feature selection software are indicated in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 together with their values corresponding to the initial operating 
I l l  
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Figure 6.14 Illustration of the algorithm to determine the composite bound-
ar>-. 
point. 
Table 6.3 Initial operating condition for line thermal overload and 
transformer overload 
Op. 
Independent Parameters 
(MW) 
Dependent Parameters 
(flow:M\V.voItage:p.u.) 
Pt. Load GenA GenB GenC Flow 13 Flow 14 Volt4 VoItl2 
Xo. 
-1 Z'2 -3 -4 yy j/2 j/3 j/4 
1 2430.0 800.0 260.8 155.0 140.17 220.57 1.0063 1.0712 
Table 6.4 Initial operating condition for voltage instability 
Op. 
Independent Parameters 
(MW) 
Dependent Parameters 
(flow:M\V,voltage:p.u.) 
Independent Parameters 
(MV.A.r) 
Pt. Load GenA GenB GenC FIow9 Flowl3 Volt" Voltl4 Qmaxl Qmax3 Qmax4 
Xo. Z-y 
-3 yi V2 93 94 =5 —6 27 
I 2430.0 800.0 260.8 I3o.O 240.6 140.17 0.9673 1.0005 585.0 144.0 86.6 
Figures 6.15 - 6.17 show the boundaries for the line thermal overload, transformer 
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overload, and voltage instability problems, respectively. The corresponding composite 
boundar>- for all three problems is shown in Figure 6.18. The region enclosed by the 
composite boundarv' indicates the secure operating region. Xote that only a portion 
of each individual boundary* is used to obtain the composite boundary*. The initial 
operating conditions for these examples are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
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Figure 6.15 Line thermal overload boundary'. 
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Figure 6.16 Transformer overload boundarv*. 
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Figure 6.17 Voltage instability boundar>". 
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Figure 6.18 Composite boundar>* for line thermal overload, transformer 
overload, and voltage instability problems. 
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6.5 Available transfer capability calculation 
According to Xorth American Electric Reliability Council (XERC) [83], available 
transfer capability (ATC) is defined as a measure of the transfer capability remaining in 
the physical transmission network for further commercial activity over and above already 
committed uses. The ATC between two areas provides an indication of the maximum 
amount of electric power above base case conditions that can be transferred reliably 
from one area to another over all transmission facilities without violating a specific set 
of precontingency and postcontingency criteria for the facilities in the control area under 
study. 
After we obtain the security boundan.-, it is straightforward to calculate the ATC for 
the interface between the area and the subarea once a specific direction of changes in 
the critical parameter values is given. 
Figure 6.19 shows the ATC calculation result for a composite boundary'. The ATC 
for Generation .4 is 132.4585 MW and it is 76.4749 for the subarea load, given that 
Generation A and Subarea load increase at the same step from the current operating 
point. 
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Figure 6.19 The ATC calculation illustration. 
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6.6 Obtaining update functions 
As mentioned earlier, if there are covered dependent critical parameters, the depen­
dency of these covered parameters on the presented critical parameters must be modeled 
since variations on the presented critical parameters in drawing the boundar\- will influ­
ence the dependent parameters according to the power flow equation constraints. This 
dependency can be modeled using appropriate update functions. 
When the presented parameters are real power injections, as is often the case, an 
allocation rule must be defined on how to compensate for changes in real power gen­
eration or demand. Suppose there are Mg load following generators. The allocation 
coefficients .4^"s are defined as the percentage of the power imbalance caused by A^i or 
^zo that is redispatched to load following generator m. These factors may be obtained 
from economic dispatch base points and participation factors [86, pp. 44-46], or they 
may be simply estimated, as in this research. 
The update function is 
where the distribution coefficients Kj^mj may be computed using DC load flow approx­
imations. They can also be obtained via sensitivity analysis using an AC power flow 
program where, for exjmiple, presentation parameter 1 is increased by Azi. and this 
increase is compensated by load following generator m according to the allocation co­
efficients, and the change in flow Ayi on circuit i is obtained (an increase is positive 
and a decrease is negative), so that Ki^mi = bi^mj = = Ir'-) indicates 
the change in circuit flow or PQ bus voltage magnitude yi due to the portion of change 
in Zj, which is compensated by load following generator m. Ki^rnj is the increase in 
circuit i flow or bus i voltage magnitude when generator m compensates for a 1 MW 
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increase in Zj. The terms Azi and Aco are both positive when the parameter increases, 
independent of whether the parameter represents load or generation. 
6.7 Summary 
The presentation techniques have been developed in this chapter for on-line visual­
ization of boundaries. For one security problem under a specific contingency, a search 
algorithm has been developed to obtain the boundary* points in the two-dimensional 
space based on the neural network mapping function. In drawing the boundary', the 
influence of variations of the two presented critical parameters on the dependent critical 
parameters is modeled using update functions from linearization of power flow equations. 
For multiple security problems under the same contingency, a composite boundary- vi­
sualization algorithm heis been proposed to efficiently account for the multiple security 
problems. The algorithm is applicable to any linear or nonlinear boundaries. Based on 
the security boundar>\ an efficient approach has been proposed to calculate the available 
transfer capability. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
Power system security is always an important problem. In today's open access power 
market, it is even more important since typical system operating conditions are much 
closer to the system limits. It is not only necessar\' to know whether the system is se­
cure or not, but also necessary- to be aware of how secure it is. The traditional security 
boundarv' visualization approach results in a two-dimensional graph called a nomogram. 
However, an intensive labor involvement, inaccurate boundarv- representation, and little 
flexibility for integration with EMS greatly restrict use of nomograms under competitive 
utility environment. Motivated by the new operation emnronment and based on the 
traditional nomogram development procedure, an automatic security boundarv' visual­
ization methodology' has been developed to measure the system security level in terms 
of controllable operating paxcimeters. This methodology proWdes a new security assess­
ment tool for power system operations. It can be easily used on-line in the control center 
and hence the s\-tem security level can be promptly captured by the operator through 
\'iev\ing the visualized boundary'. Therefore, the work in this dissertation hcis produced 
an approach that provides operators with a way to securely operate the system very close 
to the boundary. This means that the existing transmission equipment can be used more 
fully, and as a consequence, the electric energy marketplace is less constrained and able 
to operate closer to its economic optimum. 
The main steps involved in the methodology include data generation, feature selec­
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tion, neural network training, and visualization. .All these steps have been investigated 
to improve the accuracy or the solution speed of security boundaries. 
In data generation, a systematic approach to data generation has been developed to 
generate high quality data. The resulting software, AS.A.S, is modular and cen be easily 
modified for different security problems. 
In data analysis, several data analysis techniques have been used to analyze the data 
generated by .\S.A.S before neural network training. The techniques for outlier detection 
are the principal component analysis, the local training data density estimation, the 
multivariate normality test, the Kohonen self-organizing map, the scatter plots, and 
the projection pursuit visualization. Of the above, the scatter plots and the projection 
pursuit visualization can also be used to analyze data distributions. Because of its speed, 
the local training data density estimation is appropriate for determining whether a new 
sample is an outlier with respect to the training data set. This is useful in the control 
room to determine whether an operating condition is within the range of neural network 
capability. .\11 of the other methods are most appropriate for analyzing the training 
data set before neural network training, and they are supplementar\' to each other. 
In feature selection, three classes of feature selection methods have been discussed: 
cluster analysis, Kohonen self-organizing map, and genetic algorithm based methods. 
The objective is to select the best features as neural network input peirameters. The 
direct results from the cluster analysis and the Kohonen self-organizing map are clusters 
of similar features. For feature selection, one feature needs to be picked up from each 
cluster to represent this cluster. Therefore, there are different feature selection results 
depending on which feature is selected from each cluster. Some results may give higher 
accuracy, some results may give lower accuracy. There is no guarantee that acceptable 
accuracy is achieved although these methods are fast. 
In consideration of this fact, genetic cdgorithm based methods have been preferred to 
perform feature selection. In this approach, various techniques have been tried for use 
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as the GA fitness function. These include multilayer perceptrons, radial basis function 
networks, and k-nearest neighbor. Of these, use of k-nearest neighbor has the fastest 
solution speed but the lowest accuracy. On the other hand, use of multilayer percep)-
trons results in the slowest solution speed but highest accuracy. By making a trade-off 
between solution speed and accuracy, use of radial basis function networks is recom­
mended because it is much faster than use of multilayer perceptrons without much loss 
of accuracy. 
In neural network analysis, a confidence interval calculation method has been derived 
and implemented for MLPs. The confidence interval provides a measure for reliability of 
the neural network output. This is important because it guides users in interpretation 
and use of the neural network outputs. In addition, sensitivity analysis of the neural 
network output with respect to input parameters has also been derived. With sensitivity 
analysis, one can easily assess which input parameter is more important in contribution 
to the neural network output. This information can provide guidance on preventive 
control regarding the security boundarj*. 
In boundary presentation, a composite security boundary* visualization algorithm has 
been proposed to present accurate boundaries in two dimensional diagrams to operators. 
The algorithm can be applied to any t>-pe of security problem, therefore it provides a 
general way to integrate boundaries corresponding to problems of different t\-pes. Based 
on the boundary-, the available transfer capability can be obtained. 
7.2 Further work 
Further work can be done to improve the accuracy of boundaries, the overall solu­
tion speed, and the usefulness of the boundaries. In data generation, modifications are 
needed for ASAS so that the procedure can handle the influence of topological changes. 
In addition, it would be more efficient to integrate the data analysis techniques into 
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ASAS rather than use these techniques after ASAS runs. In feature selection and neural 
networks, parallel computing is worth investigation so that the solution speed can be 
further improved. .Also, implementation of on-line training is of interest because the 
neural network needs to be retrained if the operating conditions or system topolog\' 
changes significantly. In boundary presentation, it would be useful to investigate meth­
ods of increasing computational speed for the visualization software because the current 
software may be too slow for a large number of security problems. So far. the discussions 
are restricted to deterministic boundaries, i. e., constant system performance. It would 
be of interest to develop contours of constant risk that can be used to balance economics 
and security levels. 
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